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Reading the I\Iind of the School 
Board: Segregative Intent and the 
De Facto/ De Jure Distinction 
A worrl is not a crystal, transjJarent and unchanged, it is the 
sk in of a living thought and may vary greatl~v in colo r ond co nl ent 
accordin g to th e ciu 1/II! Siall c cs and the time in ;chich it is usc(/. 1 
Over 20 years ago, in Drmun <.1 . B oard of Education,~ t he Suprem e 
Court held th a t gmernment-mandated racial segregation in public 
sch ools violates th e equal protection clause of the Fourteenth .Amend-
m ent . A ft er Bro;un courts and commentators d isagreed as to the con-
stitutional doctrine underlying the holcling. 3 Some b elieved the viola-
tion arose from th e manner in ,,·hich the racia l separation 1 had been 
brought about : explicit discrimination on the basis of race. According 
to this interpretation Brown \\'as grounded in a constitutional require-
m ent of equality before th e law and the ideal of a colorblind govern-
ment ." This interpretation differentiated bet\\·een unconsti tu tiona] 
("de jure") segregation, which arose from explicit assignment of pupils 
on the basis of race, and permissible ("de facto" ) segregation, "·hich 
arose from causes other than race-conscious government action. G 
I. T o ll"nes \·. E isner , :2 1:1 U.S . ·11 8, -1~:1 (191t') (Holmes, .J.) . 
2. 3n U.S. -183 (19:1-l) . 
3. Fo r ex a rnination s o f til e e\·o lution o( tile dispute. see Di a mond , School Segregation 
in tl1e Sortil: Tl11·re I s But One Con st ituliu n, 7 H .\ R\". C.R.-C. L.L. Ru. I (1972); Fiss, 
Racial [ llliJa/aucc in /h e Pu/Jl ic Schools: T he Cunsli tut ional ConccfJts, 78 l-1.\R\". L. RE\". 
561 (196:i) [hcrcinaflcr c ited as /{uciol f!lluulan cci; Fiss, Sclwul JJn eg rcga tiun , Tlu: Un-
certain Path of th e L aw, -1 l'llrl.OSO l'llY ,\ :\ ll Pc r1. .\FF. !\ ( l!l7-l) [hereinafte r cited as 
L' nccrtain l'u liiJ; (;oodm:trt . D e Fa cto Segu·gatiun: .·1 Constitutional and E111fJi riclll 
.·lnalysi.1, 60 C:.\ uF. L. REv. '27:1 ( l ~l7 ~) ; Read . ]tu lirial Evolution of tile Law of Sc hool 
In teg rat io n Siuce llro\lll Y. Board of Education, :J 9 L\W &: Co:"'TD!l'. PROB ., Spring 1975, 
at 7. 
4- . Th e terms "rac ial se parat ion" am! "racial imbalance·· are u sed to denote a situation 
in which the ra tio o[ minoritY to \1·hite s tudents in a g i\·e n school or sc hools di\-e rges 
markedly fmm th e pro porti o ns of minority and \dtite students in the sehoul clistrict of 
11·hich those schools are a pa rt. \\' hcnnn poss ible, thi s ~ole \\·ill use th ese terlll s in 
prderen ce to the mot-e \·alue-laden term ··seg-regation·:· 
:). See, e.g .. D ea l \·. Ci ncinnati Bd. o f F.d uc. , 3 G~J F.~d ,-,:; , ,-, 8 -:,~J (Gth C ir. l!JI.ili) . rat. 
denied, 3S'J C.S . 8 17 (1{11) 7); D01ms \. Bo:ml of Edu c. . :J:Jij r. ~d 988, ~1~1-t-rJ:, ( lOth Cir. 
l!Jii-1), ccrt. rlr ·ninl . :•.so l.-.'i. 111-1 ( 1%:-, ) ; llcll \ . Sc hool C:it,·. ;; ~1 F.~d ~0'1. ~1'2-l :i (7t h C:i r. 
1963), ccrt . rl enicrl, :3 77 U.S . ~)'2 1 (19lil J; Brigg .s Y. Flli o tl. !C\ '2 F. Supp. 7/li, 777 1E.D.S.C:. 
1955) (tlnL-e -judge co u n ). 
(j_ Se c, e .g., L"nitcd Sl:I LL"S \· . .Jdfnson CorrJll\. lid . of Educ., :\80 F.'2d ~ltl:>. :l8~) r1.l (:->tit 
Cir. ), cerL. deuicd . :>09 L.S. 8·10 ( l !lG 7) (err IJ:lllc; pn cmi:<m ); SperJCn \. Kugler. c\ '21) F . 
Supp. 1235 , 1 2 ·1~ (IJ.:\.j.) , af!'d jJI: r writtll t, ·10·1 l'.S. 10'27 (IV/'2); ~lose s \. \\·as ltirrgtoll 
Parish School lld .. '27G F. Supp. 83 1, 8'1U-·1:J (E.!J . Lt. 1%/y. 
31 7 
T he Yale Law Journal Vol. 8 G : ;)1 7, l 9 7 G 
A second line of authority, h o \1· ever, focused on the propos1t10n in 
Brow n that "separate educa tional fac ilities are inherently unequal. " ' 
It argued tha t racial separa tion, and not th e m ethod b y 11 hich that 
separation cam e abo ut, was the evil condemn ed by BrmL' n .s From this 
perspective, th e distinction bet\\·een d e facto and de jure segregatio n 
\l·as illusory ; the black child in an a ll -black sch ool in :\ e\1· York " ·as 
no less victi m ized by hi s isolation than the black child in th e segre-
ga ted schools of Mississ ippi .~~ 
Keyes v . School District N o. l 1u marked th e Su preme Court 's first 
considerati on of racial imbalance in a school system free fro m a history 
of o fficially mandated rac ial assignment. 11 As such, it offered an op-
portunity fo r the Court to specify th e conditio ns under which racia l 
imbalance r esults in a constitutiona l violation. I ntegratio nists hoped 
for an affirmation that " th ere is but one Constitution" and a burial 
o f the de fac toj cle jure distinction. 1 ~ Others saw the possibility of 
limiting the scope of court intervention to cases of per vas ive and 
explic it rac ial discrimina tion. 1 :; 
The decision disappo inted propon ents of both position s. By an-
nouncing "segregative jJllTpose or in tent" to be the dividing line b e-
tween de fac to and de jure segregation, 11 the Court cl ea rl y chose a 
' · :HI C.S. a t 4'1:1. 
:-;_ Sa, e .g., C i;;neros '· Corpus Chris ti Imlcp . Schoo l Di sr. , ·Hi7 F.2tl H 2, 1·18, l:'iO (:i th 
C ir . l~J/2 ) , ce r l. de ni ed, ·tl:l l' .S. 922 (1973) (e n bane); Blocke r Y. Board of Ed uc .. 22G F. 
Sup p. 208, 228 - 2~! (E. D.:\.Y. EIG·l); see gen eril /1 \' Diamond. su fno note cl; Kars t, .\'ol Uu e 
!.11u' al R ome a ll(/ .·l nother at .·lt l~t:ns : T he Fourtn·nth . 111/CJJ(/ II!c n l in .\'atiom<' ide .·I f! · 
filicatio n , 1 ~72 \\ '. \ SII. l.J .L.Q . 383. 
~ ~- See, e.g .. Cis n cro~ ' . Corp us C hri s ti Iudcp. School Di st. . ~ fi/ F.2tl J.l 2, 1·18, ! 50 (5th 
Cir. 1972), rerl. denicr/, 'tl 3 C .S. 922 ( 197~ ) (e n ba ne) ; C nited St a tes , .. J effe rso n Coutlt \' 
lid. of Educ .. '\ 7~ F.2tl 83G. 89 7-9:3 (:'i th Cir. 196G) (Cc11·in , J. , di ssenting), rea f f irmcrl 11n d 
11/Udificd C !l /)(inr·, :380 F.2d ciS:~) (:J th Cir.), rert . d e nier! , : : s~ c.s. 8·!0 ( l ~J li 7 ); Blocker ,._ 
ll rwd o f Edu c .. ~~li F. Supp. ~08, 228 -2'! (F.D .:\ .Y. 1961 ;. 
10. 11 3 U.S . 189 ( l'J/3). 
I I. The Court p rc\ io usly h ad ref used to l'C\·ic 11· th ese " no rth er n " tlcscg rcgatio u cases. 
L ui tctl States , ._ School Di st. l :'i l o f Cook C:o nnt\' , ·!O·l F.~d 11 2:) (7 th C ir. l 'JG8) , u-ri. 
de n ied , ·102 L.S. ~1 - l !l (19/1 ); Deal '·Cincinn a ti Bd. of Edu c., 3 1 i~ l F.~d :~:i (G th Cir. I'!GG), 
ccrl. d e nied , c\89 U.S. 847 (1%7); Do\\IIs '· Boa rd o f blue. . ;);)li F.2d 988 ( lO t h C ir.), ct:rl . 
deni,·d. ~ 80 C.S. ~ Jl .J (1%1 ) ( K a 11 s~1 s Cit y, Ka nsas); Bell \'. Sc h oo l CitY. 3 ~.{ F.~d ~0~ (7 th 
C: ir. 1%3; . cat. r!wied , :177 U.S. ~~~ - 1 (1%·1) (Ca ry, Imli ;n1 ~1 ); Ta ylor \'. l\oartl o f Educ. , 
~~~~ l'.~ tl 3(i (2d C ir.), cer/. d e nied, 3Gtl C .S. 9·10 (l9til ) (:\ c11 R oc hel le , .:\. Y.). 
12 . Diamo n d. sufno n o te 'I; see, e .g .. Karst. su fno uotc 8. 
I c1. Sec, e.g .. KcH ·s \.Sch ool D is t. :\o. I, 4 13 U.S. 189, 2:iJ-:jG, 2:>8 (19/:l ) (R el111quist. J. , 
di " cuting); Bri d of Respond ents ~ It 100-01, id . (arguing t!tat " sYstclll·\\·iclc ra c ial babti C· 
ing" is o nh " ·a tT<t llted in " d u a l sYs tems" " ·Itic!t ha\'C engaged in "dila tory prac tices" ); 
(; Lt zn. /.1 flu sing .\'UI'\SIII')':. Co~I.\ 11 : :\T\RY , \Ltr. 1 9 7 ~. ~I t 3~J. r,.J(j (hus it tg res ults in 
" res trict io n o n freed o m , .. ;d1i ch m ay he "·a rr ~tnted \\· h ere "ch ildrc u in q ues tio n were 
chi ldren o f th ose " ·It o h ad d ep ri ;cd bLtcks of fre edo m in th e pas t ... hut is q ues tion · 
:t l>lc in twrtlt c ru . de facto c tscs). 
1·!. ,113 l: .S . a t 208 (emphasis in original ). T h e adopti on ol' ·'purpose or i11tcnt'' puts 
A'n cs a t th e iJllcrscct ion o f t \\·o co nflictin g lin es of cases. T h e Court h as ma nifested a 
nt ~ ttl.cd amiJ i,; tl utcc to i i.~Inl the usc o f "moti l-e " o r " purpose ·· i tt n·aluating th e con stitu · 
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middle ground. It reta in ed th e d e facto j cl e jure distincti on ,1 ·' illlpl ying 
that not a ll racial imbalance "·ou lcl violate the Const itution · 1 'i \' Ct it ' ) 
made cl ea r that explicit ra cial ass ignment would not be a required 
elemen t o f de jure segregation. 1 7 
The Keyes Co u rt, however, did no t explicate the concept of ' ·seg-
regat ive in tent ," nor did it spec ify how it might b e proved . . T.he clu es 
to be derived from th e structure and language of the Key1'S opinion 
are amb iguous,n> and subseq uent d ec isions by the Court haYe been 
equally un enlightenin g .t :' Th e ambiguity has become critical: because 
ti u n alit,. uf gmc nJillCll l dcci:;i<>ttS. 011e lin e of cas,·s s uggests th at illegiti ma te kgi,;l~ttin; 
p urpose s uffi ce:> lO in,~tlilLit e k_gisl a t io n under a , - ~u i e ty of co ns ti tutional pru,·i:; iuJJS. r: .g., 
C itY of Ricilrnotld 1. C nitcd .'iLttes , ·1:.0:.0 L.S . Cl:JS, 378-79 ( 10 7:1) (Fiftet: tltil .-\Jncndmclll. 
lu ting rights) ; \I cC o\\·:tJt 1 .. \ f:u l'i:I! Jtl. :J l)!) C.S. ·120, -!:Jel ( 1961 ) (d icta ) ("sta l,li s htn et t t 
cla m c); C<nuilli o n ,. _ Ligiltfo<>l. :Hi-! L.S. :l:3'l, :iH -·18 ( 1960) ( Fourtee n th a mi l-iftec nth 
.-\nicnd lllL'lll \ ·oL i11 g rig h ts) . 
. \n o~ilcr Iit le. IJO\\Tier. , ·igoro tblY rej ect s a n a lys is of k g is l:tti 1·e pur p<he :tS a pr"per 
mode o f inqui rY in con sti tutin n:tl Ia\\. \\'rig ht ,._ Council of C:ity of Emporia. ·1117 U.S. 
-Eil , ·lti:! ( l rii:.? J ("The c:-;i s tcn ce of a permi ss ib le purpose c:tn twt s us tain [a sc hool IJOa ni J 
actio tl tlt~tl h as an impennis,iiJic dlec t." ) ; :\onmod , ._ Harri son, -ll !\ C.S. -!5:-,, -liiG ( I 'J / !l J 
(quo t ing n ·r /g ltl ); Palmer v . Thompson , •lli!i C.S. 217 , 22,l <~:J ( 101 1) (eq ual pmtcct ion 
chall e nge: to c los ing o f municipal f:t ci li ties to a1o id in tcg r:llion) ; Cnited S ta tes , ._ 0 '1\rit·JJ , 
!)~)I U.S. 3G7, !3 81 -t\:j (l'J(jt)) ( First ,\tne ndm e nt cl:ti m ) . 
For disc uss io ns o f th e role of " pu rpose" or motivatio n in con st ituti o n a l l:111·. se c: 1\rc; t , 
l'aiill tr v. Tl w111 jJ.w n: .· In .·lj;jnoll c lz /o /lie Pro/Ji e m nf C'ncun ., lilulionlll Legis /alive 
Mul i<.·c, 1'171 SLI'. C r. Rn. ~1 :\ El 1, Lcg-J.,falivc and i l d111i n is lralive M ulivalion in Cou-
sti tu/luual Lmc. 79 Y.\LE L.J. 1:.?0:1 ( 1 ~1/0J ; :\o le , Racial llll/)(zlance in Llz e J' u/J lic Sclzoo/.,-
Lcgisilllive M ul ivc and lite C uns liluliutt, :,o \-.\. L. Rr.v. 46 ·1 ( 196-1). 
IS. .Jus ti ces D oug la s a n d J'o,,·cll, IHnre\Tr, d issented from th e dec i:>iot J to maintain 
the tli st inctiotl. ·ll !l C.S. at ~14 - 17, 2 19 -'\ti ( respect i1cly) . 
l<i. The dec is io n , lto\\·e,·er, rc>e n -cd th e question o[ \\· li n h e r d e Ltctu scga·gatio tl also 
may be a const itu tio nal \ io lat io tl Utlder so me ci r c ums tances: 
\\' c h:11e 11 0 occts inn to con side r itt this c:1sc II'!J c th cr a " m :ig hi>orl10otl sc lwo l poli cv " 
o f it se lf 11· il l jus tih r:1ci :il or e thni c conce tll r:ttion s in th e abse n ce of :1 fit Hli ng th :1t 
,;cl wo l :lll tltoriti es ILt\'l; t <>llllllitted :tch C<llbtitutitl g de jur r: segreg ati o n. 
-ll :i C.S. :1t ~1:.?. Th e Court·, rece nt dec is ion in \\ ' a sh ing ton v. lh1·is.% S. Ct . :21HO ( 1!1/GJ. 
cas ts douiJt lltl til e a>Scrtion tli:tl til e qucs tillll is st ill o pen. In lFusltington. :111 elnpllJ\·-
111 ent tliscriminatilln ca,:e, th e C:"un fot111tl th at tile faCl th a t blacks sco rul loJ\\·n tli:ti l 
11·!Jites o n ~ ~ f:Jci:il ly IJUtt r:tl ci1·il ;;cn·ice aptilllde test did n o t in i tself m :1 b : :q >plictt itHI 
of that test IJy til e goi'C rtllll Ci lt a \ ioLllion of equal prot ec tion. ln til e cu urse of its 
opi11 io11. til e ll.ll.lft ingl o t/ Co u n r c:l< l A.'ews a s e nun cia ti11 g t il e "bas ic e qu a l pro tec tio n 
principle th at tile illlidi nus qu :tlity of a Ja\\· claimed to he rac iall y discriminaton· must 
ultimatcll· be tr:tcctl to a racially di scrimin:Jtory purpose," and appr<JI Cd /\e yes on t hat 
ba s is. ld . . at 20-18. Thus. a f ter ll 'rz slz/ngl on, a s lto\\·ing o( de jure scg reg~t tion 11·o uld appear 
to be csse ll ti:ll to es tablish :t e<nrq itu tio 11:tl , ·iolati o n. 
17. T il e action s :tt iss u e i11 1\!'YCS d id n o t i11 1oh ·c e:-; plicit ass ig nme nt o f children tn 
sc hools llll the ba s is of th e ir r ~tcc, but \l·e re d ec is ion s on th e siti 11 g of IH'\\. sc hool s a 11d 
th e g CI'I \ IIt:tJH lc ritJ g of geogr:tphicll a ttend :lllce bo11ndaries. 413 C.S . a t 1 ~12 , :.?01-0:.?. 
IS. C;nn jlrilt ' pp. ;1~ 1 -~~ infr,z <l' ilft pp. ' i~li-~/ in f ra. 
19. Sec .-\u s tin lmlc p. School Dist. 1·. C nited Stat es, 4:j U.S.L.W. 3·1 l:\ (C.S . ll ec. li , 
19/ li), vamling and u ·tn rn!ding jJcr c urirnn Cnited S tates Y. T c:-;as Educ . .-\ ge n cy , Sci:! 
F.2 d 380 (:1th Cir. 1U7G) ; \\asliit1gton 1. D :ll is, % S. Ct. 2010, 201 8 ( 1 ~1/li ) ; it!. at :2lJ :i l-:i:i 
(Stl'\ells , J. , CO IIUliT!II g ); ,\ ( i ll ik. c tl 1·. ll radlc: . ·li S l'.S. 717, 7-l::i ( 10/·l ) . 
. \ft cr this .'\otc 11:1s i tt print , th e Suprcllll: C:" u n iss u ed it s opi tJion 11 1 \'i llagc o f 
,\ditt gton II cig lt Is '. \f e tropolit:lll Hous. De1. Co rp ., ·Ei U.S .L.W. ·lO B (U.S. J:uJ. ll , 
1!.177), h o ldi11g that ;t f:t ilu re to rezon e did no t Yiob tc th e equa l protect io n c lan se w h ere 
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there is no r ecent hi sto ry of rac ial ass ignm ent Ill the :\orth , th e batt le 
over the constitutionality oF racial imbalan ce in northern school sys-
tems h as tu rned large ly on the presence or absence of segregatiYe in-
tent.::t'i Different courts have defined segrega tive intent in radically 
different 11·ays, yet th e Supreme Court has recently passed up severa l 
opportunities to r eso lve the i ss u e . ~ 1 
This Note e:'>:ammes two interpretations of "segregative intent" 
n o ''di sc riminatory purpose or inte nt·· had l> ee tt prmcn. In findin g ~ lack o f di,;crimin a -
ton purpose . til e Co u rt ide n tified , .. ,,· it ilnut purporting to be e xh a u st i1-c , s ubj ec ts o f 
prope r inqu ir1 in dctumitling I,·!Juhcr raciallv discriminatory inte nt exi sted .'' I d. a t 
1078. 
Til e Cou rt' s cnumcratiotl ami ;1 n a!1·sis uf relc1a nt Ltctor>, il o\\'CI·cr, indica tes n o clc~ r 
c hoi ce bctiiTCn a s ubjccti, ·e and a 11 in s titulion;tl test for intent. Sec pp. 3~1- 27. 33:) .. f'\ 
infra . The op ini on r efers exp lici t h · to the "nwt ivation ·· of th e defe ndants, ·1:) U.S. L.\\' . 
;1t -107 :">. -1017-78; rf . pp. ;\~[-~~ iufm , ;rnd dt:c- nh re lcl-;ltll tile co ntempora neous state-
ments and subsequ e nt test imony of m e mbers of the cl cc is ionmaking both . ·l :i u.S.L. \\' . at 
-J07 K; rf. p. 3~ - 1 infra. Ho11 en:r. tlte Coull ;1 pparenth· d id not fed h a n d ica pped 1!1' 
a lack of tcs timo nv of d ec isio nmakcrs regardin g their subj cctil'e m o til·ati o n. Id. at - ! 07~ 
tt.20. Other clements of the dccisiun point t011·ard an in s titutional an~lysi;;. The Court 
apparentlY reaffirm ed th e f...'l'yr;s presump ti o n o f continuity of inte nt 11·ithin an in st itu-
tion. id. ;lt -!077 ; r f. pp. 'i ~li - :.!7. :i:H; in fra . . -\11d it held to th e interpreta tion o l' Palmer 1. 
Tlwmpso 11. -!o:; t.'.S. ~ 1 7 (197 1) adopted in \\'; tShitlg-ton 1·. Da 1 is. 'II) S. Ct. ~0!0. ~0-EI 
(1'1/liJ. -1 :1 L'.S.L.\\ ·. at -W/7 11.10. Sec pp. :\~7. :\'\7 infui. Fmthnmore. the Court noted th at 
"stlh.stantile departures" from prior po lin m;11· he rc!t:1 :llll t11 a finding of intent if "the 
fact ors u sualh· con s idered intpo rt ;ltll i ll· the d cc is ionm:1kn s tmnglv fan>r a dec is ion con-
tran to th e one re ach ed. "·!:"> L.S.I..\\·. a t -!077 :\: Jt.1 7. Cf. pp . Ci'\7--ll infra. 
The . ..Jr/ingtun Heigltls op inion stronglY con firms some of th e s ubsidi ary anahsis o[ 
this :\ o tc. Th e Co urt d e ni ed th at discrimitLl tory purpose n eed l;c th e dominant or 
print:ll l <me. -F> l.' .. 'i.l.. \\·. :1t ·10/7; rf. p . :;~;; infru . .\[on·m n. ils :111ah s is i,; illcons istcnt 
11·ith ;1 s trict forcsceah ili tl Lt·>t, sn; -!:"> CSI..\\'. a t -10/ :) -/li; rf. pp. ' i~ ~-:1~ i nful. 1ct reaf-
firms th e relcl a n n : o[ di spwportion:ll e imp;1ct i11 the searc h for purpose. ·L'i L.S.l..\\· . ;1t 
!077; rf. p. 'lcl ci infru . . \nd it suhjcct< ·d a Ltilme to ;tn tiJ constitutional n:lt C\1·. Cf. pp. 
:no-:: l infm . 
On on e point. hoiH:I·e r. the Co urt 's ;1p proac h ts at odd ,; 1\·ith t h ;lt of t his 1\o te . .-\ 
purtio n of the opi 11ion i,; dcl·otcd to th e question u f the cons istency of the Yillagc's zonin g 
polin. -l:i L'SL.\\· . :1t - 10/ ~ ; this :\oJt: critici zes the usc o [ a r equirement of consi sretiCI' 
;Jt note '1-1 infm. 
~0. F.g .. Lnited States 1·. Sc lwo i Dist. o f Omaha. :">:l l F.~d o>:i U (S th Cir. ) . rat. denied , 
1~ '1 L.S. '1-IG ( 1 ~17:"> ) ; lLlrt 1 . C:o mnll!n it.l .'ic lwol Bd. of Educ., :'il~ F.:ld 37 (~d C ir. 10 / :i) ; 
.\Iorg;Jtl 1. Kerri ga n. ,·,u•J F.~d :>~0 (1st C: ir. 1~17 - ! ). rc rl. dl.'llin/, 4~l L'.S. %3 ( l07 :iJ ; Higgins 
1. Board of Educ. , :iO~ F.~d //~1 lljt.h Ci r. E17·1;; Oli1cr 1· . .\!icltiga n State Bd. of blue.. 
008 F.:.!d 1/8 (Gtlt C: ir. 107-!J. cerl. denied, 'l:l l L.S . %C) (19/:i); Sor ia 1. Oxnard Schoo l 
Di.st. B tl. o f Trustees. 408 F.~d :)7'1 (~ !tit C:ir. l ~J/3 ) , cut. rlcnicrl, 'J I G u.S. ~J:il (1974) . 
For :1 general di:-;cu~:-~ioll of a nun1i>cr of d eseg regation cases llll'lling on "' intent ,'' sec 
:-; Oll', Forno :a /; /c Racial s,·grcgo/ iull - .·1 I' u:Siliii/JI ion of l_' /I CUllS! illll iullll{ i I y, '"' :\LB. L. 
RtT 1-11. 1:">0· :·,;; (1 ~17 :-> 1 : C:1sc :\otc. Scru111l Ciu11 i l l! cvicil', 1'1/J-15 T rTIII. ·!2 BRoOI'U .' 
1.. R L1·. !Jb l . !1/li- ;~o t l'l /li ) .. \l'tn tlti .s :\1>!<.' 11·:t .s in pr int. ;ttl t·x cc llcnt cxami n;1t io t1 of 
the scgrcgat in: intellt ct.s<.:s through 0111111111 appeared i11 :\ole, lnl r: n/ to Scgrcga/r:: Tl1c 
On1 r1lw l'rcsu nljJiiun . H (;ro. 1\. _IS II . L. R 1:1·. 7/:i ( l !J /IiJ. The Cl>ncl usiu n s therein a rc 
large]\· comis tent 11·ith th e :t nah ,; is prc,;e nted h e re . 
~ l. F.g .. ,\us till ln dcp. Scholl] Di s r. I. \j nitcd Sutes. 4:i C.S.L. \\' . cl-113 (u.S . D ec. Li. 
1'1/li) . vacoling anri H'lllllllliing jJI'I' curia111 L ni1 cd States 1·. Texas E duc . .-\gencY, ,-,3 ~ F.~d 
;\~1) (:">til C:ir. 1'171i ); '>Iid!:ttld lnd..:p. Sc it~>lll Dist. 1. l'nitcd States. 4~-1 l'.S. 9 10 (1!1/li) . 
dcnring cal. to :"d !l F.~d ()0 (:->til C: ir. l' 17o>): lhnon 1\d. of bl u e. 1·. Brinkman. -!:l:l u.S . 
lUOO, dcny/ 11g u 11. lu ,->! ;; l·.~d 8:!3 (l-ith C:ir. 1'17 :">) ; Buch ;IJWl 1. bans, l:l ci U.S. 911:1 ( 10 /li ) . 
aff'g lii C III. :J<i ;) F. .'iupp. - i~ S (D. D e l. 1'17:>); 'ic lw()l Di s t. ol Oma h a \·. L'nited St:1tcs , -}~ ;: 
L'.li. 0-Hi , r/cnyiug cui. tu :i ~l F.~d s;JO (C:th C: ir. 1'J7:J ) . 
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which have b een articulated in the case ] ;m· ancl investigates their 
suitability as r eadings of Keyes. It argu es that ne ither interpretati on 
is adeq uate. The Note then identifies a third interpre tation o f segre-
gat ive intent 11·hich is implici t in a significant part of the case law. 
T he Note develops a test for tdentifying segregat ive intent under this 
third interpretation and argu es that thi s test m ost com pl ete ly ca ptt1res 
the policies underlying the r etention in Keyes of the de facto 1cle jure 
distinction. 
I. In tent to Segrega te: T11-o Interpreta tions 
Co urts since Keyes have agreed on the importance oE "segregative 
inten t," yet their dec isions have articulated t11·o di st inct definitions 
of the te rm . Several cases, search ing lor some ta int in the process by 
11·hich decisions are mad e, have equated "segregative intent" 11·ith a 
subj ec tive desire to segregate on the part of d ec isionmakers. O th ers, 
focusing on r esults of the d ec isionmaking process, have held that a 
school board or its members should b e h eld to have " intended " the 
reasonably foreseeable conseq u ences o f th eir decisions.~~ Ne ither of 
these interpretations presents a convincing explanation of the nature 
of the "segregative intent" required by K eyes. 
A. Intent as the JV[o tive for Individual Actions: Subjective Intwt 
As the term is used in ordinary conversation , " intent" refers to the 
subjective purposes or motives behind the actions of individuals. 2 :.; 
"Segregative intent, " therefore, m ay be taken to refer to the desir e fo r 
segrega tion motivating individu al school officials. This in terpretation 
will be termed the "subj ective test" for segregat ive intent. 
Some of the language in the Keyes majority opinion can be read 
to endorse the interpretation tha t "segregative intent" refers to the 
subjective motivation of individual school oHicials . ~ 4 According to the 
Keyes maj ority, the Denver school authorities' actions were "delib-
erate"25 and "purposeful";~ll " purpose or inten t" 2 7 was sa id to dis-
22 . Cases haYc co mm ented on thi s di1ergcncc. E .g. , Diaz \'. San Jose U ni fied School 
Dist., 4l:Z F. Supp . 310, 329 (~ . 0. Cal. E!/G); H us bands \'. Pennsylvania, 395 F. Supp. 
1107, 11 32 (E. D. J>a . 1975). 
2:l. The J.: eyes majority passes m ·e r th e po te11 t ial distinctions among "p urpose ," " in-
ten t," a nd "motil e." This l'\o te amids th e usc o[ '' motil·e ·' except when referring· to the 
subjecti \l: intent of indi1icl ua ls. 
24 . See 4 13 U.S. at 233 (1973) (POII·cll, .J., collcurring i11 part and di ;;scnting in pan) 
(ap parently in terp reti ng m :~jori ty as referr ing to "su bj cc ti 1-c intent '' of sc hoo l authorities). 
25 . The Co urt adopted th e district coun"s fi11 d ing c[ "deliberate" anion . !d. at 192 , 
198-99 . 
2G. /d. at 208 . 
27. / c/. (cmph~1sis i11 original) . .-\!t houg h the uec isio n dues !lOt specify >~·hethcr ·'pur-
pose" a nd "intent" arc to be t~tkcn as cqui,·alcnL or altcrnatin:, t11·o courts k11·c con-
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tinguish de jure from de facto segregation. Similarl y, th e Court held 
that the proof o£ segregati\·e intent \\·irh r es pect to one area of DenYer 
left the school authorities \\·ith th e burden of sho wing tha t th e ir ac-
tions in other areas of the cit)' .. ,\·ere not also mot ivat ed b v seoTeoa ti ve 
' 0 0 
int entions. '' c ~ Focusing on this lan guage, several lo\\·cr courts have 
used a subj ective tes t for segrega tive intent.~u T hi s interpretation , 
however, is beset by significant di fficulti es . 
l. T heoret ical and Practical Diffiw lties 
If the actions under consideration are those of a governmental en-
tity, it seems probl ematic to look to the m otives of individuals in or-
der to discern the purposes o[ publi c ac ts of a "coll ective l\·ill. " 0 " 
el uded that ]\. eyes uses th e terms S)'I I() IJymu u ,; h · lo d en ote th e purp"ses o r l!lot i\·ati o i! S "E 
in d i\ idu a l sc hoo l offic ial:<. llroiJ S<>Il \· . Board of Ed uc. , :) :2 :) F.2d 3-H , :J i i'l (()til C ir. 1~1/ :)), 
rnl . d enied , 9li S. Ct. l oGS (1976); Husbands\ . l'enn sy h a nia, 'l~ l :i F. Supp. 1107. 11 3:J-CH 
1E.D. Pa . 1975) . 
:20 . 4 13 U.S. a t :209 (e mphasis added). 
29. Tht: ::\inth Circ uit generall y ha s adopted a s ul>jcLli\·e les t for inte nt , n :qull'lng 
e \·id e nce that " sc hool au thorities h a d inte ntio nall y di scr iminated ;1~ain s t minority SUI-
den ts by practi ci11g a d e liberate policy of r:t c ial scg-reg·ation.· · Soria Y. Oxn~1nl School 
Di s t. Bd. of -rrus tees , 488 F.2d 07 ~1 , )85 (:lth C ir. 19 /:i ), ra t. d cuicd , ·llG C.'i . ~ :)l (19 74), 
'f lWi ed iu Johnson "· San l'ranc isco Cnifi ed Sc hoo l Dist .. 500 F .:2d :14 9, :15 1 (9 th C: ir. 
19 7 1) (per curiam). ] oil uso u, h o \I'C \'l' r , illl t:rp re ts A:cycs as r csen in~ til t: ques ti o n o[ 
\\'heth er "[e]n g raEting n e ig hborhood schools onto in\'oluntary neighborhoods 1\LI \' be 
s1dfi c ienl ratifi c tti o n of th e illicit inte nt o f o th e rs" to co ns titut e: d e _illl'l' seg regation. !d. 
~It 3:) 1 n.l. 
T \1·0 Sixth C irc uit decis ions h~l\ 't: :1ppare nll y a d o pte d th e suiJj ecl i\'l' lL'S l . In Brun son \'. 
Bo:ml ol' l~du c .. ''2:) F.2d :\4-1 (l)th Ci1. 1'1/:i ; . Cf'l'l. rlcllil ·<i, :HiS. C t. ll)li:i 1 1~1/1) ) . the Co urt 
reaffirmed it.s p1'l'-l\.t:Yn tkcision i11 Deal \'. Cincillll clti Bd. of blue .. :lli'l F.~d ;, ; (lith 
Cir. 1%6) . Ct'J'I. dcui e<i , !J8l) U .S. ~Hi ( 1%7). In J)eol th e court upheld a ne i~hl>o rhood 
sclwol poli cY that produced racial imhalancc.: it note d that courts shoJdd not qu es ti o n 
such policies \,·h e n the\' arc "conce i\nl \l·itlwut bias" a nd result fwm "th e L!ir minded 
judg m ent of th e >Ciwol oiTicial.s." !d. at Gl. Ju Higg in s \·. Board o f blue. , ,-,us L2d 77~1 , 
7' 1~\ (Gth C:ir. 1 ~ 1/ ·l ). th e co urt affirm ed th e d ist r ict co urt 's rcfus ~ tl to infer intent. Th e 
di s trict co urt had st;lt ed: " lt is impos:< iblc to C<~llce i\ e t iLtt tiH:r c J! C\ LT \\'Cl'l' and a rc not 
!10\\' i11di\ idua ls \l·ithitl the SYSlenJ .. \lh" arc not moti\-~lt et l IJ,. r:J c icd l>ia> . . \l the 
same time, th e e \·idcn ce s ug gests th ;!t they \\ 'CJ'c lle\·L-r ;thlc to ac hicn: a1HI Jn~lii!LiiiJ the 
uppe r hand. " ~ ~F' F. Supp. ·l-11 , ·189 (\\: _1)_ \lic h. 1 ~ 7 ' 1 ) . See gc ucrul/ y .\brshall , '1' /u; 
S /all(/llld of ln lt:nl : 'Fwo Recen t ,\tic!tiga n Cases , ·I J. L \ \\' & Eo LC. 22 7 ( l~l i:i ) ( int n -
prc tin g· Higg ins ;1 s requiring- suiJj cc ti\e imc nt ). 
Di strict court opinions in other c ircuits cx l!iiJil clcln Cili.S of til e suhj ect i\·e iiJI<: rprcta-
t ion. Sec .\mos \·. Bo;nd of School Direc tor,; . JO:) 1-. Supp. ili0, S l 9 (E.D . \\' is. l 'l i G) (a p -
p ;tre nth· ba s in g findin g o[ inte nt on test i;n o n y t!i ;Jl sch ool board \\·:1s " un ;d tcrahh· 
opposed to a11 \· form of forced int L·~ r:tlion ;tlll l . [di, f J 1111/ /)('//eve in ill! \. snhst ;J ntial 
r: tc i ~d iiJtegratio!J in th e schools' (e mpk1si s ~1ddcd ;) : HusiP11ds \·. l'cnn sY I\ania. : ;~1 :) F. 
Supp . IIU7, 11 3:1-:H (E.D. P:t. 1 ~/ :i); .\lorg;1n \· . l-lclllli gan. :17 9 !-'. S upp. 110 . -1 70 - / ~J (D. 
;\b ss.), af f' d .\lib no111 . ;\ [o rg:t ll Y. l'.nr iga n. ;. (J~J F .'2d :)80 (1st Ci L 197-1), cert. d e nied , 
1'! 1 US %:1 (19 / c'iJ ( alt c i'IJ ~Iti\c d di niti<Jll of scg rcg;1li\ c i11lct!l: "de:; ire to bring a bo ut or 
coJJLillliC scg-rcg~It.ion"' ) . 
';()_ Sec \\ - ~J s hin g ton \' . Da \ i>.% S. C t. '20·10 , '21hl ( 1 ~1/ ti ; 1-"lc\'l' ll :< , J. , CO!J Citning ) ; J-I;J!l 
·c. C:o lnnlllnilY Sch<~o l Bd . of blue .. ,->1 2 l-. '2d '\7. c> O ('2d C: ir. 1 ~170) (" \ \. hell \\'e co ns id e r the 
· . 1· I . . I l I l · ·,tJ··· . cl; .. ,tlt.n\2" WJ.i.lt ,·t cu i lect in : nJ<> l l\ ;ltJ(>Il 0 j> C<>j> C COihlllllliJl g :t :;c 10<1 JO 'll'l ... \IC ~ ~ ~ 
\Iii\. It is dil'l'i cult enoug l1 tu find th e coll ecti\'C mind u [ ~~group <Jf legi sla to rs .... ll is 
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"Legislative intent," for example, has long been distinguished from 
the subj ec tive purposes of individual legi slators.:n The probl em is par-
ticularly striking in view of the fact that courts generally ha\·e held 
that segr egative intent n eed not be th e "dominant motive" behind 
the school authoriti es' d ec isi ons in order to invalidate them. I nsteacl, 
"segregative intent [need only be] among the factors that motivated 
... [school board] action s:·::~ The illicit m ot ivations of an incliviclttal 
oll"icial thus might invalidate a govemmental decision that could be 
justified on nonracial grounds. Such a result is both illogical and 
unfair. As Justice Stevens has \\Titt cn in a similar context: 
It is unrea listic ... to irn:aliclate othen,·i se leg itimate action 
simply beca use an improper motin~ allectecl the deliberation of 
a participant in th e d ec isiCJJla] rm >cess . A law conscripting cl erics 
should not be invalidated beca use an atheist voted for it.:::: 
Similarly, two circuits have noted ·'t he diffi culties of ferreting out a 
collective m otive and conversely th e injustice o f ascribing coll ective 
will to articulate remarks of particular bigots."::t 
en~ n il ;t rder to find the mmi 1atio11 o f loca l citi ze ns. many of 11·hom 1nndd be as relucta nt 
Lo admit that th ey ha1·e r;t c ial prejudice as to ad mit that they have no se nse of humor. " ) 
3 !. Sa Fletch er"· Peck, 10 L".S. (li Crancll ) 87, 130- 3 1 (18 10); no te 82 infra. 
'12. K.el' cs 1. School Di st. :\o. I. 4 1c) U.S. 189, 2 10-11 (1973). Although this Ltngu;tge 
d ea ls 11·itll the burden of proof rq{anling the re mainder of a school sys tem once scgrega-
tin: intent h~1s beet\ csuiJlisllcd in one area. lo11· cr courts han: hcltl that segrcgati,·e 
itllcnt need be onl\ a mong tilt: fa c tors motil·ating sc hoo l board actions to establish a 
prima L1ci c case of segrcgati1 e int e11t. Hush~lncls 1·. Pcti\ISI'hania, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 
11 34 (E. D. Pa . 19 / :i ). See Soria ,._Oxnard School Di st. lld. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579 ,588 (9 th 
C:ir. 1~.17 3), cui. deuicd . -llli L.'-i. ~.lSI (1974) ( m~Ijor iss ue of fa ct 11·as mnits of dcfcnda11ts' 
contention tl!;tt "onll' justifiab le cri te ria form ed the bas is for th e deci sion") ; !\! o rga n ,._ 
H enniga n. 37'1 F. Supp. '11(1 , -178 (D. i\!ass. ) . u!f'rl suu 1/Uin. i\I organ \'. 1\.enig;m, :)O'J F.2d 
:iSO ( l s t Cir. 1'174), c~:rl. d en ied , 4~1 U.S. 90;1 (19/:i) (" Intent to seg regate need not be th e 
sole purpose o[ the ddctltl:lnt\ :tctiom; it need unl v he om: of them. "); .-\mos , .. Bo:trd 
of School Directors, -!00 L Supp. 7li:\ S IS (E.D . \\ 'is. EJ7li ). n ut see lhonson 1·. Boanl of 
Educ., 5~5 F.2d 3H, cHI (lith Cir. l~J/ :"l), CC I I. denied, ~IS S. Ct. IGI.i:) (19/li) (implying that 
"dominant motii 'C tes t" h:ts not lJeett supe rseded). 
The rejection of the "dominant pmpose'' test is supported by the Supreme Court's 
obsenation that 
[t]h e s ~~trch for lcgislati,·c purpose is often illusii'C Cll Ough , ... 11·ithout a require -
ment that primacY he :tscert a in ed. Leg islation is frequ entlY multipurposcd : th e 
rcmm·al o[ el'cn a "sub<>nliltate'' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of 
lcgi sla ti1·e judg ment supporting th e statute. 
~fcCinnis 1. RoYster , ,110 L.S. 2li cl. 270-i7 (197 3) . See Brcst, stljmz note U, a t IHi-2-i (sug-
ges ting "domin:tnt moti,·c" tes t in ;tppropriatc for cqu;tl protect ion an a lysis); cf. :\'ote, 
L egis/olive J>urjJ o.1e, 1/oliuna/ity, 11nd Eqwil Prula!ion, 8~ Y .-ILE L..J. 123, 12G-27 , 13~ -!)8 
( 1 97~) (objecting to failure of courts to 1:ccogni zc tha t s tatu te ma l' ha1·c se1·cral purposes, 
all cqualh· tlcccss :t n to its p:tssag-c). 
;rl. Washington 1. Da1 is , 9Li S. Ct. :20-JO , :.:'lJ:",-l (19/G) (Stclcl\S , J., con curring). 
3-L Hart I. CommunitY School lid. o [ EdtlC., :)12 F.2Ll elf, so (:.:'d C ir. 1975); United 
States 1. School Di s t. o[ Om;dl:l , :J:.:'l F.:.:'d 530 , 5% (8 th C: ir. ), ccrl. denied, 4~:1 U .S. 9-IG 
(1970) (quoting J-f11rl ). 
The conceptual diffi culti es noted in te~t can be met by scleral theories. T1m theories 
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Yet even i[ th e gap bet\l·een individuals and institutions could be 
bridged, it ,,-o tdd remain uncl ear ,,·hose subjective intentions are rele-
vant. Cases have turned on th e discriminatory purposes o[ school board 
membe rs,::~ superintenclents,::c assistant superintendents,:;< voters,:'·' and 
parents.:;n :Moreover, there is no indication \\·hethcr one clecisionmaker, 
a plurality, or a majority must harbor segregative intent. 
The nature o[ the r equi site subj ective segrega tive intent 1s also 
unclear. Some courts appear to hold that a constitutional violation 
occurs only ,,·hen school authoriti es seek to cliscrilllinate against mi -
d c r in, fmm the cl:tss ic justification s for imputing men s rc:t to a corp o ration ott th e 
h:tsis of indi1 idu:tl states of mind. See \lrH> EL l'r::--: .11. CotJE ~ '.'.07. C:umment at 11G-01 
(TcJtl. Dr:tfl :\r,. •l. 1~0 :",): :\lue lkr. ,\( nll li cll onrl th e Curj ){nrilion. l'J C. l'tTT. L. Rr:1·. 
'.'l ( l'F,/); '\ole. l Jaisioll/11(//;inJ!, :\/ odds illld the Control of Cu rjJUI'(l fl: Crime, s:; YILE 
L.J. 10~11 , 1U~ -l - 9(j ( 1~/G) . First, since :1 corporation (o r a school bo:trd) :tCls throu gh its 
officers and agents, courts lt<ll·e C<Jtttc nd cd that an c:o;tension of the doctrine o[ 
respo nd eat superior requires that the purposes , m o ti1-cs, and in te nt of any of these 
ag e nts or officers sho ul ll he considered those of the entity. J:.g ., :\ew York Cent. & 
H.R.R. , ._ l'nited States, '.'1'.' cs -lKl. - 1~1 - ! (l'HI'IJ: Lnir cd St:tt cs I .. \ & I' Trucking Co., cl:) tl 
L.S. 1:21 , l:.! ti-:27 ( l9C>iir l_' nitn1 States 1. H:1111 L. Yo ung & So tb. -Hi-1 F. :.!d 1:295, I'.'% ( lOth 
C: ir. 1~17 2). Second. it is argu ed th:tt the intent of hig·h managerial offici a ls should b e 
imputed to the corporate elltit,·, becaw;c th e ir minds really constitute th e "a lter ego" of 
the corporatio n. See \l onEL l'E:\ .\t. CooL ~ 2.07 ( l )(c). Com m ent :tt Fd (Tent. Draft :\o. 4 , 
JqSS) .. \ third theory. alhancul by Professor Paul Brest, holds that when citizens arc 
disad1antaged by an administrati1e or kgisLttiiT decision in 11·hich decisionmakcrs harbor 
illicit subjectin: motintions, those citi zens ha1-c been depri1·ed of their opportunity for 
a full and fair assessm ent of the merits o f th e decis ion. See, e.g ., Brest , sujna note H, at 
116-18. Brest, ho11-c1·cr, neHT makes c lear 11·hcthcr he is referring to th e actual sub-
jectil·e intent of gm-crnmcnt officials or to a metaphorica l "purpose'' analogous to 
"lcgisl:tti1e intent. " See p. 'lcH iufm. 
Each of these theori es might justify the attribution of subjecti1e imli1·idual states of 
mind to a corporate ent ity a nd offer sottte g uidance in determining ,,·ho must be 
exam in ed for improper motil·ation. Since no court has attempted to usc these or an y 
othn theories, holl·el'cr , lkcisions adoptittg the subjecti1 e iutcrprctation of "segregati\e 
intent" ha1·e remained theoreti cally unfoumkd and Cl idcntiarily conf used. 
:1:!. Amos 1. Board o[ School Directors, -108 F. Supp. 7ti:i, 80~ 1 . 8 19 (E.D. \\'i s. 1976); 
Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, ;)Sli F. Supp. S'l9 , :)11J --l2 (C.D. CaL l!J7·l); 
;\[organ 1·. Henniga n , :l7~ F. Supp. ·1lll, ·1'.'8, -1- -lS-4~. ·IS:.! , ·103, ·10-1-, ·ISS, -I-SO (D. Mass. ) , 
a ff'd m/.J no111. i\lorg;_tll , ._ Kerrig:tll, SO~ F.2d 5ii0 (1st Cir. 1~7 -1 ), cerl . d e nied, 421 U.S. 
Vii:! (1975). 
3G. Amos \'. lloard of School Direc tors, -lOS F. Supp. 765 , 8 19 (E.D. Wis. 1976); 
,\-forgan ,._ Hcnniga11 , !1 79 F. Supp. ·110, ·127, 45·1 -SS (D. Mass.), aff'd w/.J nom. Morgan 
1·. Kerriga n, 50~) F.2d 580 (1st Ci r. 1974), et:rl. deni ed, ·l2l U.S. %3 (1~75). 
37. United States,._ School Dist. of Omaha, 52 1 F.2d :i30, 540 n.20 , 5H tt.30 (8 th Cir. ), 
cerl. d en ied, 423 U.S. ~J46 (1975) ; Amos 1·. lloanl of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 7Gc>, 
SI S (LD. \\'is. 1976); Morgan 1'. Hennigan, 37!) F. Sup p. 410, 427 , 439 JJ.i9 (D. Mas~.). 
aff'd stlU nom. Morgatt 1'. :Kerriga n , 509 F.2d 580 (1st Ci r. 197'1), cal. denied, 421 U.S. 963 
(197:'>). 
clS . u nited States Y. \lissouri, 51:) F.2d i % :), PliO (Sth C ir. ), art. denied , 42cl U.S. 951 
( l ~J7:'i); cf. Rcitm ~m 1'. \lulkcy , 387 U.S. %~1 ( 1%7) (sta te11·id c referendum held to ha1-c 
raciall y discriminatory purpose). 
39. United Sta tes 1·. School Disl. o f Omaha, :,:21 F.:.!d 530, 510 It.'.'U (8th Cir.) , cerl. 
de nied, ·123 C.S. ~JJ(j ( 1'!7:}); :l!mgatt v. Jlcnni gan , '1/~J F. Supp. ·110, ·127 , ·DS (D. Mass.) , 
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noriti es . 1i ' Other courts, h o\\·ever, have stated that "racial hostility is 
not the applicable stanclard"'; 11 subjective segregative intent may be 
es tabli sh ed even ,,·here the goal of the school board is found to be 
"quality education for all students." 1 ~ 
Finally, the subjecti\C: tes t poses severe evidentiary profJlerns, prob-
lems that stand in th e ''ay of consi stent and principled adjudication. 
Since individual decisionmakers will rarely admit improper motiva-
tion,1:; a finding of subj ective intent generally must be interred from 
circumstanti a l ev idence. In e\·aluating such evidence no set of facts 
compels a finding of illicit motivation; 11 behind any act may li e a 
number of subject ive motivations. Thus, judges mu st rely on th e ir 
knO\d edge of human nature in deciding \\·hether particular bets arc 
indica tive of segrcgat i\·c intent. This unfocused hunting exped iti on 
has two conseq uences . First, decisions of trial judges are difficult to 
revie\1· meaningfully. The finding of subjective intent is peculiarly 
dependent upon the credibility given to the statements o f officials, 
and appellate couns therefore have traditionally deferred to the 
trial court's evaluation o[ demeanor ev idence on issues of motive. 45 
'10. Suc h courts han: d ef ined the s tandard for ,·iolation in terms that seem to require 
actio11s discriminating ag~tinst minorities. rather than actions reflecting desire for rac ial 
separation. Sa, e.g ., Zamor~t , .. :\ c,,· Braunfels lndep. School Dist., 362 F. Supp. 552. 554 
(W.D. Tex. 197:1). u:v"d fJa Clllilllll, 5 1~) F.2d 108-l (5t h Cic 1975) (f inding ··no intent . 
to dcprin: \lcxican·.\mcri caJJ children of an educational opportunity equal to that of 
children of any other r~tce·} 
4!. \!organ 1·. Henniga n , 379 F. Supp. 410. 478 (D. Mass.). aff"d sub 110111. i\lorgan v. 
Kerrigan. :)0'1 F.:2d :iSO ( lst Cir. 1(17 4). cert. denied. 421 U.S. 963 (1975) ; :;ec Higgins , .. 
Board of Educ. , 508 F.2d 779. 793 (li th Cir. EJ7 '!) (requiring ··purpose ful segrega tion," no t 
··an evil. malcnJlent. malic ious ~ tnd snbj ec tiH: in te1 1t '") . 
42. Amos , .. Board of Sch ool Directors. 408 F. Supp. 76:i. 8 10, 819. 82 1 (E.D. \Vis. 19/li). 
4:3. See United States\. Texas Ed uc. ,\ gcncy. 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5 th C ir. 1976). l.'IICaled 
and re111anded J'er cu/"111!1! su/1 nom . .-\ustin Indcp. School Dist. \". United States, 45 
U.S.L.W. :\413 (U.S. Dec. li , 19/li); Hart v. Community School Bel. of Educ. , 512 F.2d 37 , 
50 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
4-l . See, e.g., Higgins , .. Board of Educ. , 508 F.2ll 779, 793 (6th Cir. 1974) (""While it is 
tru'e that a co urt may inft:r such an intent fro m the circumstances there is no authority 
for the proposition that such an intent 11/1/.sl be inferred in all cases 11·here segregated 
patterns ex ist in fact. The inference is permissible, not mandatory ." (emphasis in orig-
inal)) . 
45. See , e.g. , U nited States , .. Oregon ;'.fedical Soc"y. 3·13 U.S. 326, cl32 ( 1952); United 
States , .. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 3-11 (1941 ) ("" Findings as to tile design. motive 
and intent 11·ith which m en act depend peculiarly o n the credi t g iven to 11·itnesscs by 
those \\"ilo sec ami hear them " ·) r ei/ow Ca/1 11·as recentlY cited as controlling· in J o nes , .. 
Pitts Countv lld. of Educ. , 5:28 F.2tl 414, -Jl7 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975), a ci,·iJ rights case in-
volvino· an ~ ·tlicn· cdh· ra ci alh· moti,·ated discharge of a bl ack schoo l teacher. 
The" on h· Gl~C i1 .1 ,,·hich . a co urt of appeals usi ng th e subject i\e test has rc,· iewed a 
lo11·er cour·t.s appli cation of tile same test upheld the finding !Jy til e tri~tl co urt aml 
emphasized the deferen ce th:tt must be p ~tid to the trial court"s findin gs 11·ith respect to 
moti,·arion. Higgins \". Board nf Educ., ,-,o~ l'.2d 779 , 7~l cl (lith C: ir. 197-J ). C:ouns of ::tp -
pcals that ha\c JT\Trsnl lower court findin gs of lack o f subj ec tin: scg rcgati\·c intent 
have app~trcntlv used a different intcrpret~ttion of scg rcga tin: intent. See United States 
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In addition, beca use o( the diiJi culties inherent in inferring m otive, 
dec isions employing the su bj ec ti \ e test are likely to be inconsistent 
and unpredictabl e; they are incapab le of providing schoo l boa rds or 
litigants 11·ith cl ear standards as to "bich fact patterns will evoke a 
finding of segregat ive intent. 1 ' ; Th us, fo r example, som e courts have 
fo und subj ect ive intent to segregate on the basis of a school board's 
fa ilu re to ado pt integrat ive polici es, 17 while others have refused to 
ini'er subject ive intellt except upon a showing tha t school officials had 
actively interven ed to foster segregat ion . 1s 
2. Sub jective Intent and the Sujneme Court 
Not only does the intepreta t ion of segregative intent as subj ec tive 
motivation seem fla\\·ed, it appears to be at odds with th e stru cture 
of the Keyes opinion . In K eyes the Court h eld tha t a finding of in-
tentional segregation in one geograp hica l area or the Denver school 
system raised the presumption that racia l imbalance in other geo-
graphical areas of the same system was also intentional. ·I !J The pre-
sumption was not rebutted by the facts that the d ec isions affec ting 
the second area were neither con temporaneous with the intentional -
ly segregative decisions regarding the first, nor were they made by the 
same decisionmakers.Go As a rule for determining subjective intention s, 
v. Texas Educ. ,\ gency , 532 F.2d ~lSO (5 th Cir. 1976), vacated and 1'CIIlllnde d per curiam 
sub 110111. Aust in Indep. Schoo l Dist. 1·. united States, 45 U.S.L.\V. 341 3 (U.S. Dec. 6. 
1976); United Sta tes \'. School Dist. of Omaha , 521 F.2d 530 (8 th C ir.), cert . deni ed, 423 
U .S. 946 (1975). These cases arc discussed at n o te Sl infra. 
46. See !\. eyes 1·. School Dist. :\o. l , -11 :.1 U.S. 189, 233 (l'o11ell, J., concu rring in part 
a nd di ssenting in part) ("The results of li t igation- of ten ani1-cd at subjcc ti1 ely IJ" a 
court cndcan>r ing to ascerta in the subjcct in : itttutt of sc hoo l authorities ... _ ,,·i ll be 
fortu itous, uuprcdi ctalJ ic, and n-c n cap ri c ious.' ') 
-l7. Morgan Y. Kerriga n. 509 F. 2d 580, :185 (1st C ir. 19 74), cert. denied, 42! U .S. 9G!l 
(1975); Amos \'. Board of School Direc tors, '-lOS F. Sup p. 765 , 819 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
48. Diaz 1. Sa n J ose u nifi ed Sc hoo l Di ,; t.. 'll 2 F. Su pp. 3 !0, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1 ~J7ti ) ; 
Cra11·ford v. Boa rd of Et luc. , ' !(j Cal. App . 3d 872, 120 Cal. Rptr. 334, 337 (1975), rcv'cl 
on state gro11nds, 17 Cal. :ld 280, :'iS ! P.2d 28, 130 Ca l. Rp tr. 7U (1976). 
49 . ·113 C.S. 189, 208 (1973). 
,-,o. O ne comment:ttnr no tes th:tt in the f,", ·yl'.i ca,;e th e trigger for th e litigati on 11·as 
the r esciss io n of a n in tcgra t ion plan due to a cha nge o f the boa rd 's nH·mbcrship. Further , 
2 1 diffe rent citize ns fill n l the sci"C II places o n th e Dcn 1·er school boa rd during th e 
pe riod under li t ig·ati o n. aml on ly t11·o of th e board memlJcrs 11·h o approYed th e act ions 
fiJund to innJ!I·e scgrcg:tlii"C it llc ttt .sencd on the sc lt ool bo:trd to which the presumption 
was applied. C: tsc C:o mmctt t , h. c1-c,; \'. Scltoo l Dist rict :\o. l: Unlo ckin g the :-.·o rthern 
Sclwulltotw' 1Juo1·. 11 H .\RI' . C:.R.·C:.I..L. RF\. 1~! . 110 ··11 ( l ~ l/ · 1 ) ; sa h.cn·s 1. Sch ool Dis t. 
:'<o. I . :)~ ! F.:ld -!G:), cJSS (lll tlt Cir. ! ~17:) ) . CCII. denied, 423 c .s. I OG6 WJ/G) (Seth , C.J.. 
concurring o n rem:tnd: "O n tlti ,; int ent m :t llcr it must be o bscn-cd tlt at sclt oo l 
boa rd s co me and go, :t ltd tlt crc is lit tle il :tny con t inuity o( polio o n an y subj ec t :t.s th e 
old members lca1-c and tt e11· ones :tt"C elected. T lt c record here clear ly demonstrates t lt is. 
Scltool polic \' ca nn o t be a continuitt g o ne o\T r a long pcr iod a nd should not be ; thi :; 
:tf tcr all, is tlt e rc:1sott for t·lcctio ns ... ) 
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this presumption m akes little sense. The motivations of schuol board 
members at the time of one deci sion bear no n ecessary r elation ship 
to th ose o( their predecessors or sttccesso rs regarding anoth er decisiun.~' 1 
Finally, the Court's dec ision last Term in TVashingLon v . Davis···~ 
casts furth er doubt on the acceptab ility of the subjective intent test. 
The lVashinglon Court, c iting Keyes, held that a finding of " d is-
criminatory p urpose" is necessary to es tabli sh a ·violat ion of the equal 
protection clause.~:; In so do ing, the Court was forced to consid er its 
earli er d ec ision in Palmer v . Tlw m pso n ,'· 1 \\·hi ch explicit ly rej ec ted 
mot ivation as an element of equa l protection ana lysis. In Palmer the 
Court held tha t the segrega tive pu rpuses of the J ackson, Miss issippi, 
ci ty councilmen could n ot inva l idate an ordi nance closing municipal 
S\\·imming pools in the face o[ a desegregat ion order. The decision 
in Washington recon ciled its adopt ion o f the " discri minator y purpose" 
standard 1\·ith Palmer v . ThomjJson by interpreting Palmer as h olding 
"that the legitimate purposes o£ th e ordinance ... were not open to 
impeachment b y ev idence that the councilmen were actually m ot i-
vated by racial considerations: ·~~ If invidious "purpose" is required 
for a violation of the equal protection clause, but actual mot ivations of 
officials are not appropriate evidence of " purpose," the inevitable 
conclusion is that the " purpose'' r elevant for equal protection analysis 
differs from the motivation o[ individual dec isionmakers."G The 1Vash-
ing ton Court's reading of K eyes as an e'\:ample of genera l equal pro-
tection analysis implies , therefore, that "segregative purpose or intent' ' 
should also be clisti ngu ished from th e motives of incl ivid nals. 
:>1. See i\fayu r 1·. Educatio nal Equ:dit\ l.ca g m:. lEi U .S. GO:i, G:Z:Z-::!3 (1CIH) (refus in g to 
;tll o 1,· ptTS Uilll llio n that discrimitt:tton poli ciL'S JlllhliL'd h\ official "·nc co ntittucd h\ ili .s 
s uccessor) ; Spomn 1 . L it tleto n . ll ·l LS :'>1 l ( l <Ji-1 ) (snnule). 
It has been a rg ued tha t tile pres utnptifltl maY he defe nded n ot on til e bas is o f its 
empiri cal ,·alidit\. but hy f:tirnc,; s C(Jnsidcraliflm. Set: Case Comme 1tt, sujna note 50, at 
H:Z ( i11 light of difficulti es of pro1 itt g itt tc ttl, IJ<•ard 's supn ior access to information 
r egardi ng mo tiH·s of its m e mbe rs :11Hl c1nployccs jus tifies s hi fti ng burden of proo f) ; 
1\otc, ! nler-IJistricl JJ cscgrcgotion, T /u; n onuining OjJiiu ns, :28 ST.\:\. L. RLV. 5:21 , 5 :2li <ll 
(19/li) . lt sculls clear from tile A'cYc.\ opinion. il u m:\Tr, that the pres umption \\·as based in 
large part on th e "rclcl·a lt Cc .. of th e intcttt of the IJoanl at on e time to its intent at other 
tim es, a nd th e "h ig h prolt:tiJilitl . . t ha t s imil :tr imp n miss ib lc cnnsidn:ttions mot;l .:ttcd 
actio1 t in o th er ;m : a s .· · 4 1:\ U.S. :1t ~07 - 0~. 
!'>:2 . ~Jii S. Ct. ~0 10 ( I 11/li). 
:)3. Jd. at ~0-1~). 
:J t. 4o:; u.s. 2 17 (1<J7 1) 
:i:) . 'JG S. Ct. at 20·1 ~!. 
,-,li . J'mfcssor .-\kx:lltd c r Hickc:l drc·11· :t .s in1il:~r di,;tillCtio n bct\\·ce n a "lcgisl:ttin; pur-
pose" ("·l!icil h e defin ed ;t.s "citlt n the n:11n c gi,·,·n to tltc C:ollrt· s oiJjL·c tin~ asscss nwnt 
of t h e dfcct of :1 s t:tlllt c 1> r a col tr!ns itm:t t \ tnm den o ting· tile Court's ind l'pc ndcnt jud g· 
mcnt of til e col lSii t ut io n :tl h · all<> \\':t b lc e n d t il: •. t the k g is l:t ture co uld lt:r 1·c had in ,·jew") 
a nd a "psn: il o:tn:tlnic'' inquir' itt to the ··1nutin-s'' <>f indi1 idu ;tl lcgisl:ttors. He argued 
tha t the l:tttn inquin· j,; in:tppr< >pr i:tk in co ltstituli<>n :tl l:tll·. :\. BIC:h l: l.. TH!: LL\ST 
D .\ :\{;EI(()LS lki :\CII li'! -lj l , :ZII::l -11) ( I ~Jli:Z ) . 
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B. Intent as Foresight: Objective In te n t 
.\ second interpretati on o f segregat ive intent takes as its premise 
that an actor intends the foreseeable results of hi s actiom. U nder thi s 
''obj ec tive'' interpretation , segregati ve intent is demonstrated by a 
sh0 \1 ing that racial imbalance is th e n at ural, probable, ancl for eseeable 
res ult of the cha llenged sc hool board policies.~• T he Second C ircuit 
panel in Hart v. Cotnmunit y Sch ool Board of Ecluwt ion• s \\·as th e 
Jirst court to articulate thi s pos ition. Th e court interpreted K eyes's 
refe rences to m o tivation as dicta and n oted th at "the m or e orthodox 
test fur intent is the obj ect ive one.··.>:J A finding of de jure segTegation, 
the J-Jarl courl cuncluclccl , may be based utt "act ions taken , coupled 
,,·ith omissions made ... " ·hich ha ve the natural and foreseeable con-
seq uence of causing educational segrega tion."uo 
'". Tile prin ciple that an actor is ildd to in tc nd tilt: rt:asonab lv foreseeable res ults of 
his ;tctioiiS li ;ts imprcssi\·c commo n Ia \\· a ntecedents. F.g., \\' . PRosS ER, THE L1w or 
ToRTS~ S (·lth ed. l~J/1 ) : RISLYI L\1C\T (Su~o.' t> ) OF ToRTS~ 8.-\ , Co mm ent iJ (196:)); I-LL. .-\ . 
l-1 .\lrr, l'LJ ."S II\I E:\ T :lt\O Rt:SI'O:\SniiLITY 1~0-~ 1 ( l~IG S) (foreseeabi lit y s tandard for int <: lll in 
cri min a l Lm). 
Similarly, "intent" UIH.ln fcdn :tl s tatut<:s has IH::cn linked to foreseeabilitY. In labor 
1;1\\·. the unfair labor practi ce of intentionalh· discriminating aga inst unio n e mployees 
may be es tabli sh ed \l·ithout refcrcnce to subjccti\'C motin: where th e practice in question 
ttlla\·o idaiJl y d iscrimin ates. E.g., ::\ L.RB \. Eri c R es istor Corp., :173 u.S. 2:! 1, 2:!8 (19G:l). 
Furthermore, :\lomoe \'. Papc, :lGS C.S. 167, 187 (1961 ), ho lds th a t 12 U .S.C. § 1983, unde r 
\\·IJi ch many school desegregation suits :11-c brought, " sho uld be r ead against tltr.: back-
g-rouml of tort liability that mak r.:s a man respo tt s iiJk for th e n atu ral consequences of his 
actions." Monro e holds that liability tulllcr ~ l ~Jt-:3 requires no finding of \1·i!fulness. !d . 
;,s. :'i i~ F.~d 37 (2d cir. I 97S). 
,-,~. Irl. at SO. In adopting th e forcsn:abilil,. test, the H ar t court also relied o n \\' right 
\. Co unc il of th e C it\· of Emporia , ·107 L.S. -l :d ( Jll /~). a school dr.:segregation case (not 
m enti o ned I;\· the r:cyes majorit\') th at forcdulh· di,;;t\'0\led inqniry into th e m o ti\ation 
of ckc isionmakcrs. In Wright th e Suprt:mc Court obser\cd th a t "[tJhe ex iste nce of a 
pnmiss iblc pmposc cannot sustain an action which has an irnpennissible effec t." !d. at 
·lG:!. 
T he Ilar l comt's reliance \laS appa ren tly misplaced. In \\'ash ingto n \·. D av is, 96 S. Ct. 
20-10 , ~0,~9 (1976), th e Court interpre ted Wr ight's rejection of moti\·;ttion;ll anal\sis as 
limi ted to situations cha llen gi ng a sch oo l IH)a rd 's response to a n o utstandin g desegrega-
tio n order. Jl 'as!tingto n clearly required a sho\,·ing of "intent " to establi sh an initial 
\·io lati o n of the eq ual protection cbuse. See Husb;utds , .. Penn syh· ani;~, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 
Jl 33<J:l (E .D. Pa. 19 / S) (adopting interpretation of Wrig!t t simila r to that of IVas!ti ngl u tl 
Court). 
60. S l2 F.2d at SO. Three other co urts h;~\·c exp licitl y used thi s objccti\'e test. U nited 
States \',Texas Educ. Agency, S32 F.:!d :l8tJ , 387-89 (:J th Cir. 1976) , vacated and re111anclecl 
/Jfl' c11r iam SllU no111. Austin lndcp. School Dist. \'. Cnitcd States, 4:) C.S.L.\\'. 34 13 (L'.S. 
Dec. G, 197G); Bradlcv \' . .\Iillik r.: n. 484 F.~d 2 10. :!:!~ (Gth C ir. 1973), aff'd in relevant 
jJit l'!, :JJS C.S. 717 , 7'18 1LIS (1973) (adopting dist rict court's reliance ott "natmal ami 
pn.:dict ;tblc effect" of schoo l board policies); :'~!orga n \' . H en niga n , 379 F . Supp . 410 , 478 
(D. ;\lass.) . off'd SliV no111. Morga n \·. hnriga n , :·,og F.2d 580 (1st C ir. 1974), cal. denied , 
4~1 C.S. 'lliol ( 1 ~/5) (altcm;tt i\t: holding: suhjt·ctilc tl'sl ). Ji ut .1ce not<: li 7 infra (a ltcm a· 
ti\T interpretation of Un ilt'd Stal es v . Tc .\ rts J:r/ucat iun . lgenry). 
Othn decision s ha\C sug·gcstL·d ;t fon·sc·cal;ilily test. ;l[or;tl cs \·. Sh;ttttt<lll , :j iG F.2d 
·111 , ·JJ ;j (:'i th Ci r. ), a rt. denier/, 4~:.1 t:.s. IU:H ( l97S), held that seg rcgati\ c illlcn t existed 
\1hcre " [t]hc impos itio n of the 11 e ig hbo rhood as> ign mcnt sys tem froze the Mexican-
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Focusing as it does on th e obj ective consequ ences o f ac t ions, th e 
Harl formulation avo ids som e of the theore tical p itfall s of the sub-
ject ive interpretation . Its identifi ca tion of intellt ,,·ith fo reseeable 
consequences elim inates th e need to defin e the su bject enterta ining 
intent. Moreover, the standard for fi ndin g intent is clear. T he court 
is, h o \\·ever, som ewhat disingenu ous in asserting tha t th e difference 
between its interpreta ti on and th at o f courts which have a pparentl y 
adop ted a subjective test is " largely seman tic. "'; 1 \Vhile it is tru e that 
th e sam e circumsta nces ma y g ive r ise to a fi nd ing of inten t und er both 
subj ective a nd obj ec tive inter pretations,u:? th e la tte r S\,·eeps Ltr m or e 
broadly. u:; 
In fa c t, the interpretat io n o f in tent as fo reseeability a mo unts to a 
prosc ription o f all rac ial imbalance in public sc hoo ls.'; 1 \\.here an y 
racial imbalance ex ists in a school d is trict , the failur e to ad opt po li c ies 
tha t a llevia te the imbalan ce n ecessaril y ma inta ins and per petuates th e 
imbalance. Such a result is clearlY n a tural and foreseeabl e.r;:; Thus anv 
' ' 
school authority tha t tol erates raciall y imbalanced schools ,,.otll cl be 
held to have acted with segregati ve intent under the fo reseeability 
test. 6 6 
.\mcr ica n stude n ts into til e [seg reg a ted ] sd w o ls. Th er e could li a 1e bee n no o th e r r es ult 
and this is st ro n g· e1·ide n cc of segr egatorv in tent. ·· .\!th o ug h this pos ition see m s to imp lv 
tha t e1·idence of suhj ec ti1 ·e inten t \\·mild h a ,·e bee n d e termin a tive, th e di s trict co urt 
(presum a hl v \\·arra nting d c flTe ltCc on suc h factua l nut tc rs) fo und th at th e e1·ide nce pro n :d 
··concl usi1-e ly" t ha t no such suhjec ti n :: pmpose ex is ted . 366 1-' . Su pp. 8 13, 820 (W .O. Tex . 
19/:l) . T hus , in rnersing t he findi ng o f no in te nt. th e co urt o f appea ls m ig ht be ,:iewed 
as h av in g em p loyed a fo rccsceal.>ili t:· tes t. T h e E ighth C ircuit in C nitecl S ta tes 1·. Sch ool 
Dis t. of Oma h a , S~ l F .~d :i :lO. :,;;;·,.g(; (Sth C ir. ) . ccrl. d enied , 4~3 C.S. 946 (1975), h e ld 
that fo r eseea b le seg rcgat i1·e effect:; r a ise a presumpt io n o f seg rega tive inte n t, a n d quoted 
a t leng th fro m th e H art co un ·s :1.ssa ult on the subj cc t i1·c p11rpose fo rmu la t io n . 
Gl. :i l2 F .2d a t 51. 
fi2. In d eed , s in ce to tks irc a11 otttcnm e one m us t fo r esee i t . whe ne ver t he su bj ec-
ti l·e tes t \\·u tll d lead to a fin d in g of inte n t , th e fo reseeab ility tes t IHHil d do so a lso . 
63. F:.g ., COIIIjJare C r:m fonl 1·. Board o f Educ ., ·16 C a l. .-\pp. 3d 872 , 120 Ca l. Rp tr. 33 l 
(1975), rev·d Ull >l ate grou nds, 17 C tl. 3d 280 , :i:il P .2d 28, 130 Cal. R p tr . 724 (1976 ) 
(su b jec t i1e) with :\Io ralcs 1· .. 'i ha nn o n , 5 16 F .2d ·111 (Sth C ir.) , ccr l. denied , 123 U.S. 103 ! 
(197S) and H a rt , .. Co mmuttit l· Sc hool Bd . of b lue. , :> 12 F .2d 37 (2d C ir. 19 75) (o bj ec ti,·e) . 
(i4 . See Case :\ole, sujn a n ote 20 , at ~J6:i-G 7. 
GS. A poss ible exccp t iOil to thi s :trg umc n t mig·ltt ex i,;t ldJCrc ex tant r ac ia l imbalan ce 
\\· ill fon:sceably be r edu ced hv de m ogra p h ic t r en ds w itho ut school hoard inte n -en tion . 
T \\·o r es po nses ·ca n be ma d e to thi s o hj cc tio n . Fi rst. to th e ex te n t th a t th e sch oo l boartl"s 
in ac tio n p e rmits imba lan ce to exi st in th e short term. that ina c t io n st ill ·· m a in ta ins" ' 
seg rega tion . Seco nd , eve n if the obj ec tion is g r:111t cd. th e fon:scea bility tes t reduces the 
categor y o f ··cJ c facw ·· scg n :g :t tio n to ,; eg rcgat io n th :tt " ·ill tli sa p p ca r " ·ith o u t schoo l b oa rd 
in te r ve nt io n . 
66. See C n ited Sta tes 1·. Tc , :ts Etlt 1c. Age ncy, :):l'~ F .2d 380, 302 (:ith Cir. 1976), v acated 
an d Te 11 u1nd cd fJer cur i11111 sui> 1111111 . :\u>r i11 Jndcp. School Dist. Y. Uni tctl States, 43 
U .S.L. W. 3-11 3 (C.S. D ec. G, 111/G) (:tct.iotts 11·hich ··h ad th e n a tural , for eseea ble , a mi 
an> idablc n :sult o f creating an d m a in ta in ing an e thnica ll y seg rega ted sc lwo l s1·s te m '"); 
H a rt 1·. C:o m m uttity Sc hoo l 1\d . of Educ. , 5 12 F .2d 37, ·17, 49 (2d C ir . 197 :">) (appro1 ing 
fin d in g of di stri c t c.ourt o[ ·· forc scca hlc effec t of main tai ning or pt:rpctuat ing severe rac i:tl 
im ba lance· ·; de jme segregat ion is th a t ·· ctuscll or m a in t:tirteu i>y s ta te ac ti o n '} 
329 
The Yale Law Jomnal Vol. 8G: :n7, 197G 
Since the foreseeability test disapproves all racial imbalance, it de-
stroys the distinction ben,·en de facto and de jnre segregation-the dis-
tinction "segregative intent'' \\·as to have defined. The Hart court, 
apparently aware o( this tendency, sought to avoid obliterating the 
category o[ de facto segregation by assuming that inaction ,,·ithout 
more 1\·ould result in de facto segregation.';' This interpretation is 
difficult to reconcile with the holding in Keyes that "intent," and 
not "action," distinguished de facto from de jure segregation.';' More-
uver, the distinction ben,·een action and inaction seems untenable. 
As one court has argued: "\\'hen administrators face the problems of 
managing a dynamic system, they seldom have the luxury of 'mere 
inaction.' Every decision to act for racial balance or to fight it has 
consequences."(HJ This reasoning is correct. In the context of a system 
of compulsory public education, the distinction between school board 
action and inaction is illusory. 7 '1 A.t the beginning of each school year, 
67. 512 F.2d at 18. 
The Fifth Circuit in Cnited States \. T exas Educ. Agency, :)32 F.2cl 380 (:'ith Cir. EJiG), 
vacated and relllanderl jn:r curialll su/J 110111. Austin Indep. School Dist. \'. Cnited States. 
4:) U.S.L.\V. 3'11:1 (U.S. Dec. {i , l~7G), also recognizes this difficulty, but attempts to stop 
the expansion of the de jure categorY by adding a limitation that the segregation must 
he not only foreseeable, but "a\Oidablc." !d. at 38~. The addition of this criterion 
makes the Te.-:as Education .·lgency test more akin to the test for "institutional intent" 
described at pp. 337-42 infm than to a strict foreseeability test. The precise reason for 
the Supreme Court's remanll of Texas J-:d uratiun .cJgency is unclear since the optnton 
consisted of a single sentct1ce \ acating ;tnd remanding for "reconsideration in light of 
\\'ashington \· . Da\is, 426 C.S. 22~1 (1{)7G)." [5 l ) .S.L.W. at cl-!1'3. HO\I'C\t:r, Justice Powell's 
COllCttrring opinion, joined lJ: Chid Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, emphasized 
the difficulty of remedying the racial imbalance in the ,\ustin schools. !d. This may 
indicate that the Fifth Circuit did nut gi:e sufficient scope to the notion of "a\oid-
ability.'' For a further discussion of the case, sec note 75 infra. 
liS. ·11 :l U.S. at 20S. 
li~l. }.forgan :. Kerrigan, ,-,o~J F.:!d c>oiJ, :)01) (lst C ir. 1~7 -1), ccrl. denied, ,1:!1 U.S. %:) 
( 1~7:,). Oddly, the Hart court cites ,\Iurgau 11·ith apprmal, Hart\'. Community School Bd., 
,-d:! F.2d 37, 51 (:2d Cir. El/cJ), \Tt it ignores Murg11u's reference to the "unreality of the 
action / inaction dichotomy." ,-~o~ F.2d ;Jt ,-,0li t1. 1i. 
70. Cj. Sisters of l'r<J\ idence of .'it. 'dary of the \\'oods \·. City of ELtnston, :\:l:) F. 
Supp . 3%, ·!03 (.'\.D. Ill. 1~171 ) (rejecting ddcmLtnt's contelllion that failure to grant 
zoning permit \l·as "p;tssi\-c·· in;tction. and het1ce not \·iolation of equal protection clause 
011 ground that "[11·]e do not ... regard this ;tcti:c -passi\'C distinction as being by any 
strctclr of the imagination a \·iablc one.") Jiul .1ec Diaz \·. San Jose Unified School Dist., 
·112 F. 'iupp. 310, :J:.~0-31 (.'\.D. Cal. EI/Ci) (:tpp:trently adopting the action/inaction dis-
tinction). 
\\'hilc toll b\1· collt:titls the principle that a failme to act is nut culpable, e.g., \\'. 
l'RoS"R. sujnll note :)7, ~ ,-,li at :l:1S-Cl'l, this principle is inapposite in :1. school desegrcg·a-
tion case. It is the pt-e\iously established policy of the school board \l·hich is a necessary 
precondition for segregation. Therefore, the school board is not like the archetypal 
ll\statHlcr 11·ho refuses to thro11· a rope to th e dnm·11ing· bather, hut rather like the 
hclmsm;ttl 11·ho fails to turn the ship ;t\\·:t\· from the s\l·immcr in its path. Se e H.R. 
\[och Co. \·. Rensselan \\'ater Co., :!17 i\ .Y. !GO, lG8, l:J~ ::\T.E. 806, 898 (EJ28) (Cardozo, 
C.J.: "The qucn al11·a\·s is \l·hethcr tile ptttatin: \\Tongdocr has ad\·anccd to such a p o int 
a.s to ha\T launchetl a force or instrum,·nt of harm , or has stopped \drerc inaction is at 
mc"t a refusal to IJecome an instrnmcnt for good . . ."); \\'. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 5() 
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administra tors must decide 1\·hi ch schools stud ents are to attend. T h e 
requiremen t that st udents :::.t tencl the same schools th ey atten ded th e 
year before is n o less an "act icm" t han the requir ement tha t they ride 
school b uses to ne1\· schoo ls. Reaffirmat ion of a n old po licy I S no less 
subject to constitutional r c\ iew th an adoption u[ a nc1,. on e.' 1 
T hus, the action inactio n distinction is hardly a persu as ive h edge 
;~gainst t he tendency of th e ' ·foreseeabil i ty·· test to eliminate the cat-
egory of d e facto segregat iun. ·, :c t rnd er !\.eyes th e concep t of segregatrve 
~H 3-1 0. By C::\tablishing a ~ c hnnl ·"Y:' te!n . set ting C( lln pubory :1tt: ·11 d~l! 1Cc zone:-;, and con · 
t in uing to adh ere to th o:;e zoP c' ' · r.h:.: ><J H,cd ih 1~ 1. rd has "bliilcil n i" t lie fo rce;; til~l t arc 
llt:C C~:' :lry C ~t li S C:' (J[ Ltci:d ~cp ~!Ll!it~ rL 
,\dtnittedh. >itu:ninm mighr C'\ i'l v.i tL'll ' :t :-.c lt !JI.) I h c•~l nl l1: 1:> ;n rc!ll <' ITd i tself from th e 
npention o f th e sch ool syst cnt th:lt a "Lt il ll rL· t<l :;ct. .. ,,·n u ld ukc o n :-.ig n ifican ce under 
the to rt tes t. :\ ··n·uchcr systl'lll . i11 ._,·J1iclt tl1c ;;t~ 11c iiHT c h· proYid L· s futHh to finance 
tdlate \-cr cd uc 1tiun:d c '\pcri L' IIC L' s il! dc llt ;; o r tllt· ir p:t l'C !l h \\i sh might L>c such an 
instance. :\ " freed om of chni cc " tnn ., kr pLill \\' ithi11 a publi c :;ch ool ;; Ys tcm. on the 
ot h er hand, wou ld prniJaiJh· not he .sc h oo l iJn:trd ina ct io n un d er the to rt tes t. Th e 
hoard continues to co mpel atl l' lld~til C C a nd r c t ~tins p lcn a n e<• ntrol U\'Cr {an d rcspn mi b ility 
for) the allocat ion of curr ic u lar offcring.s, t l' ~tchn p! aCl' llH'nt. school loca t io n , and cduca-
tion~il reso urces which ca n LtrgcJ,· d eter min e th e pattt.:n1 o[ choices in a " free d om of 
choi ce" plan. In anv c1·cnt th e orig in :tl :Hiopti o n of a "freedom of choice" p la n 11·o ul d 
certain ly const itute rcY ie ll·a iJ lc ··: lctio ll ." 
7!. Sec E\·a ns \. Bllchanan. cl'(l F. .'-il lpp. ! ~ ;-; ID. De l. ) t t il rec- j ud g-c COUll ). nff'cl /1/l' /11 ., 
·\:23 li.S. 963 ( ICJ/ :i) (d ec ision 1>1 ;;ta te kgi sla tmc to r et ain school d ist ric t bo un da ries 
held denial of equa l protection ): l.' ni tcd .' itat cs , .. :'l!i ssomi . '\81' F. Supp. 1008, 1060 (E.D. 
C\fn.) , nff'd onrl qu oted <L'il li lljJjn iJ v lll. ,-,[;, F.:.'d Llii:), Ll/0 (8 th Cir. ) , rer/ . denied, •1:2 :1 
L.S. 9:)1 (19/:i ) (failure to m erge \\·hi tt· ;;chool d is trict \\' ith bl:t ck school distr ict 3U yea rs 
p re,·io usly "amounted to a con stitution ;![ \\TUlig·" ). Cf. :\cn\\·ood \'. Harrison. +1 '3 U.S. •!:J;, 
(19/:l) (co ntinu a tion of p rc-Ji n m ·n po li n of lending te:xtbooks to di scriminatory pri,·atc 
sc h oo ls h eld un con st ituti o nal ) : lbikv , .. Citv of Lmton. ·.12:i F.:2tl lO:l 7 ( lOth C ir. 1970) 
(b ilure to a lte r zo ning h eld III lCOiht it u tion al ; . 
A recen t Su pre m e Court d ec isim1 , !';l s adt:!l~t CitY l\d. o f Educ. \'. Spang ler, !.JG .5 . Ct. 
26CJ7 ( !976), coma ins di c ta that e m l>c interp reted as lend ing crede nce to th e actio n ; 
inaction d is tin ct ion IJy appa lTn tlY e:xci ud i ng- from co:1 sti tu tio nal rc1·icw r~t c ial i mbabncc 
a rising from d c mogr:tph ic m o,cnH 'lll ~ 1 nd uncil :ll lgcd geog rap h ical boundar ies. Id. :tt 
27 03·01. The h olding of t hc: ca se. hoiiC\ cr, m cnt 1.0 th e impro pri e ty o( th e d istric t cou rt 's 
o rder requiring that a parti cular dq;-rcc o( raci:d balance be ma in ta ined in perpe tuity 
ln a schoo l board, id . at 2/0·I·W> : t his hcilding >~a s narro11ly confined to the b e ts , i d . at 
:2 l 0·1; id. at 270~ 11.:2 (!IL!rshall . .J .. di sscnti li ).?; ). Th e re is :1 11 equ all y plallsihlc interpre ta tion 
of the dic ta : becal!sc th e 1Jo~1 n l uf cduc 1tio n had completed the tran sition to a unitary 
schoo l sys tem , a Jl CI,. Yio latiull \\'t>U itl nu t lie pres umed from a fail u re to cl ian gc tli strict 
bo u ndat:i es in the face of gTo\\·ing Llci ~tl imktlance. Therefore , it might h ave been th e 
abse nce of seRrcgat in: in tent. not o f " ac tion.· · 11·hich barred [11rther relief. 
72. The ado pt ion by the f-f 11 ri co urt o f a tt·st that ,;c \Trch UiHlcrmine.< th e di s tinc tion 
between d e fa c to and de ju re sq.>;rc · g~ 1 t i o t1 maY be: p ~ut u f :t brgn trend. ;\! :my >~·m ild not 
mourn th e d emise of th e di, l illcti<>ll. Kel t'S, .. Scl: o<>l [)iq. :\ o . I, ·ll cl 1: .. ~ . 18!1. ~ l ·l, :217 
(197 3) (Doug las. Po well. JJ .. COilClln ing i.1 1 p: llt ~111d d is.sc·:: t i11g i11 part. n ·spccti,·d v; (re -
jecti11,; d e facto / de jmc di,timti n llJ ; ,,. ,. C:r :mfo nl ' · Hn~m l of Etiuc .. 17 Ca l. 'id 280 , 
~~lU- 3 02. :l :l l P.:Zd ~N . ;~ ~)--l~ , l~~{) C:ld. l~ pt r. 7~-~. 7 ~ U < ~ ~ \ l ~llb) ~ !TjLctin g ck Ltc lo / dc jure 
dis ti nct ion fo r p urp ose's o f s t:t t t: c·qual protec tion cb mer 
_:\ t lea s t on e cour t afl c r l\. {')'c.c; !1a ~ :tu Jid cd til e rcquirc!l H' UL u ( scg rcg: a tiYc intent by 
finding in ~ tcad the older con~ ti t u t i o n ;d Yio!at !o n uf ~l sl.'p;lr~~!c~ and uncr!u:d ed uca tion. 
Bern· "· Sc hoo l Dis t. , :;o;, F.2d :.' c\0 (liilt C:ir. 1!17 ·11; cf. Sor ia , .. ( )x; 1ard School Dist . Bci. 
o f T rmt ces . 3ii (i r. Supp. ,; ;;rl , 0 !3 .. 1:1 ~J: .D. C al. i r1 7 i ) (ait c rn a t i,·e hold ing on rema nd: 
s cgrq~:1 t i o 11 . n .. '£~ ardl css o f (·~~u ~c, h: ts l·ffcc l o f denying cqu~tl educational oppor tunity in 
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intent serves to distinguish de jure from de facto segregation. By col-
lapsing the distinction, the forese eability test of Hart is rendered an 
inappropriate interpretation of the Keyes criterion."; The Court's 
recent decision in A us tin IndejJendent School District v. United 
,)tates' 4 buttresses this conclusion. T here, the Court summarilv va-
) 
C;..tted the fifth Circuit's judgment. 1\hich 11as based upon a finding 
of segregative intent arrived at by heavy reliance upon a foreseeability 
test."' 
11. A Third ?v1oclel: Institutional I ntent 
A. T he Concept 
2\'either of the t\\·o interpretations of "segregative intent" explicitly 
elaborated in the case la11· is a satislactury interpretation of that term 
1 ioLtti"tl o[ !~ C.S.C. ~ ~OUOd (1~170) atJd J:) C:.l·.R. ~ 1'0.:\(h)(:.') (1 11/li)\. Sec gclliTul/y l..nill 
:\: .\[oisc, Scltuol JJcscgregation Litigation in tile Seven/in a111l tfte Cse of Social Science 
Fvirlcnu.:: ./11 .lnnotatnl Guide.')~ L.1w :\: Co:->IT\11'. PRoB .. \\"illlt:r 1~1/:). at 'JO. 71-7~. 
:\llotiler lack 11as takcll lJ\" .Judge C:alch \\"right ill E1~ms 1". Buchallall, 39:i F. Supp. 
-1~8. 4-!0-1:.' (D. Del.). aff'rl 1111:111., 'l:.'J C.S. ~Gel (l'JI'l ). There, a statute exempting a pre-
dum i nan t Jy black school district from ;; s ta te11· ide rcorga n iza tion procedure was held 
to ha1e emb"died a suspect classification 11\ cffccti1eh makillg· it more difficult for racial 
minorities thall for other citizells to achic1e their goals thr"ugh the go\Trnmental process. 
For a further explicatioll of this argumellt. sec Black, Foreword: '·Stale .·lction," Equal 
Protection, anrl California's Projwsitioll II, 81 1-l.\Itl·. L. RE\". G~ . 77-83 (1%7). These 
options mav be significant!l· reduced 1J1· the holding in \\"ashington 1. Da1 is, <JG S. Ct. 
:.!U!U 1 1~/li). tlLJl discriminatory purpose is llccTs.s~;n· for ~1 fi11ding of ~Ill equal protection 
1 iota tion. 
~eJ. The author of :\"ote. sujna note cd, ~~~ 0:.!3 Il.~l , recognizes that adoption of a 
fmesecability test "completely blurs the distillctiotl bctiiTCil de jure and de facto segrcga-
tioll." He m~tilltaills, hu\\·clcr, tktt "the Ltct th:tt in school cases proo[ of ... foresee-
~thilitl" of segreg~ttii"C effects is COill"lTtiiJlc int" ~Ill impact test ... dues not disprove the 
rclci·~;Itce of those facts for demonstrating raci:d moti1~ttio11. It merely sh011·s that the 
lille bet\\·een de jure alld de Ltcto segTcgatiotl is so metimes illdiscernible." ld. 1-Icllcc, the 
author appe~trs t" collclude, permitting illfcrellce of racial m"ti1ation based soldy up011 
scgreg·atilc dl"ccts ma1· he consistcllt 11·ith r:c\c'"s requirement of scgrcgati1·e illtCill. If 
the author is c·In!Jracing· ~Ill impact test as ~~~~ ;;ccurate illterpretatimt of A.·cyes, such a 
1 ie11· seems questiotlable. Ulldcr the forcsecabilit; test, tltc line bel\\Tell de facto alld de 
jure scgregatiotl is always illdiscerniblc. C~i1e11 this fact, it is implausible that the Court 
11-cnt to such lengths to. draw a nonexistent line i11 1\cycs alld re~1ffinn it in !Yaslti11glon 
l'. lJm•is 11·hcn other intcrpretatiolls of "illtcnt" successfully presen·c the distillction. 
71. !5 C . .'i.L.\\'. 3413 (C .S. Dec. G. Filii) (per curiaiil ). 
u. Cnited States 1·. Texas Ecluc. ,\gellCI", ,-,~~~ F.:.'d :,so r.c>th Cir. 1~1/G), vacated awl 
I"C/111/llcled jJCI" Clll"illlll .\1//1 }}()/!/. Austin llldcp. School Dist. 1". United States, c!:) U.S.L.\\'. 
~i-11:1 (C.S. Dec. fi, l~IGJ. Tile pn:cisc groulld for tile C:uurt"s decisioll is unclear. See llOte 
li7 srtjna. Sillce the remand instructiom ordered rccullsidcration ill light o[ !Fasii-
ing/uu v. Davis, 11·hich ad"ptcd the prillciplc tktt "discriminatory purpose" is necessary 
t" ~till" fimlillg uf all equal protection 1iolatioll, ~liS. Ct. at ~0,18, it seems that the Court 
~~-~ls dissatis[icd 11·ith the Fifth Circuit's treatment of the scgrcgati1·e intent requirement. 
Juqicc Po11Tll. collcurritlg, opi:ted that the l"Cill~iiHl 11·;;s prompted IJy the Fifth Circuit's 
"rcadillcss to impute to school officials a segregative itllCill far more pcnasiiT than the 
c1·idence justified" a11d i11terpreted the Court onln ~b ;; mambte to rccollsider the 
exislellce o[ a cunstitutimLll 1iuLttion. ·l:i C.S.L.\V. at 3tl:i. 
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J.S usecl in 1\.eyes. A number ot cases, ho\\ e\·er, have adopted modes of 
J.n alysis ,,·hich point toward J. third intcrprctJ. tion of scgregati\'C: in-
tent.''; The Sixth Circuit's opinion in O live~· v. i\lichigou .\ lute !J uuul 
of Edu cation'' nurks the genesi s o l thi s approach. 
In Oli1. 1CI the court recognized that A.' cycs req uires a lincl ing of seg-
regative intent to estab lish d e jure segregation.'' Ho\\·ever, it \\as re-
luctant to all o,,- sch ool o fficial s to clelend the ir actions by producing 
evidence of nonsegregat ive subj ect ive motivat ion s: 
When constitutional rights are im·ulvecl, the iss ue is seldom '' heth-
cr public officials hav-e act ed ,,·itlt nil 1not ives or ,,·hether tll ey 
lla\c consc iously plotted ,,·ith bigotry in t heir h earts to depri ve 
citizens of the eq ual protect ion of til e ]a,,·s. Ra th er , und er the 
test lor de jure segrega tion , tll e ques t io n is \\hethcr a purposefu l 
pattern of segregation has manilcstecl itselt ove r tim e, despit e tlt.c 
fact that individual official actio us, cousidcrcd alone) may n ot. 
flu ve i.Jeen taken for seg regative jJll rjJoses ({lid may /lOt fUll'e- UCI.:H 
in th emselves consti tutionally in val id.' ~' 
Nonetheless, the court avoided equa ting segrega tive intent "-irh fore-
seeable racial separation. Instead, it shifted the focus of analysis tu 
the nature of the school board's " policies": 
A presumption of segreg·ative purpose arises ,,-hen plaintilfs estab-
lish that the natura l, probable, and for eseeable result of public 
offi cials' action o r inac tion ,,·as a n increase or perpetu at ion of pub-
lic school segregat ion. The presumption becom es proof unless d e-
fendants a ffirmati vely establish that their ac ti on o r inaction \\·as 
a consistent and resolute application of rac ia ll y neutra l policies. ~ 0 
The Oliver decision thus adumbrates a third concept ion of segre-
ga ti ve intent, here denoted " inst itutional in tent," which turns on an 
iden tificat ion ancl eva luation o l insti tution a l policies. I'\e ith er Oli ·un 
nor the other d ec isions groping tO\\arcl a model uf ins t itutional in-
tent81 have articulated its theoretical foundat ions. An understanding 
/(i. Sec !lotc S l infra. 
77. :iOS l'.:?d liS (6 th Cir. 19/l ), ccrl. denied, 1:21 U .. ~. 9li3 ( 1 ~1/5) . 
7S. !d. ::~ t l S~ -83. 
7'1. / r/. (e mphasis added ). The p:1":1g c appc:Ir< p:tnicul:Irh :;triking bcc:Iu se the 
"p:It tn 11 '' rdencd to \\·as dcrin:r l from the :Ictio ll <; of >CI!Oo l board s tlt:1t ll :Hl und ergolle 
changes in m e illbcrsh ip . Sec irl. at IS/ 1!.1 (\\ .c ick. J.. di ssc lltillg) . 
SO . ! d. :1t I S~. 
8 1. .\t lcaq t11·o cm1rts han: lkalt \l·itil tile tnm "scgn:g:It i, ·L· int cl ll ., ill 11·:1\·s that 
arc iiiCL> ItSistctit 11·ith th e subj cct iYc intc it t tes t , \Tl il:In: tluiic 'o \\·iti!Oll t ado ptillg a st ri ct 
[orcsccaiJilitY ll',t . l11 United St:1tc.' \'. School Dist. of Clma il:I , S:2l L~d S'\IJ, 536-CI/ (8 th 
C:ir. ) , ccrl . ric nicrl, L':J CS C) .J(j (l lJ/5), th e co urt quotL·d ~1pprrnin:.;h· Ifor(s charactcriza-
t i<ll; of scgn::,;:Itill' intc llt :IS ;Ill attriiJUtC of a "co llcc ti l·l' \\' il l. ' ' Jt fu rt her appro\'Cd :111 
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of these foundations must begin ·with the recognition that this model 
consid ers "intent" to be an attribute of institutions rather than indi-
viduals for purposes of constitutional analysis. Since school boards and 
their associated bureaucracies do not have "intentions" or "purposes" 
in the same sense that individuals do, this concept of "institutional 
intent, ' " like that of "legislative intent," is avm,·edly a metaphor.'~ 
School boards cannot truly have intentions, but they may be perceived 
to act as if they harbor "segregative intent.., 
Intent, under this theory, should be inferred solely fro1u institu-
tional ztctions. The institution is perceived as a single actor; no at-
tempt i·; nnde to pierce the institutional facade an d reconstruct m-
dividt~ a l states of mind or decision processes. Instead, the institution 
is trea ted as a black box; only institutional actions and the circum· 
stances behind them":; are subject to direct examination. Such ins"i-
c:triicr Eighth Circuit statement that purpose is to be cktnmined by its natural allll 
reasoua\)lc effect. 11·hatcn:r maY k11·e been the motin·s upon >~·hich legislators acted."' It 
nmlcthelt:ss refuser! to define intention solelY in terms of foreseeability. Rather, the 
Onllllw cumt examined the 1aliditY of objcctin: justifications for policies 11·ith segrcgati1e 
cmlsequcnccs. therebY permitting an opportunity to rebut a presumption of segregati1·e 
intent. Sec Amos 1·. Bo:1rd of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. /1)0, SlG-18 (E.D. Wis. 19/G) 
(quoting 0111aha extcnsi1ely). 
SimilarlY. :t l!Ulllbcr of courts halT inferred intettt o1cr long periods of time in 11·ays 
that :trc impl:tmihle if illlli1·idu:d states of mind an: at issue. Sec: pp. g~G<?I sujnu. See 
Cnited States 1·. Tex:ts blue .. \gene\. :>3~ F.~d 'lSO. 'i91-~)~ C>;h C:ir. EI/G), vucatctl and 
r~:niJIII!icrl fJ<T curiu111 suiJ 111!111. Austin Jmlcp. School Diq. 1. Cnited States, ·1:) U .S.L.\\·. 
:>!13 (l'.S. Dec. li. E17li) (actions taken prior to Brmcn couplnl 11·ith present usc of 
m:ighiJorlwod school policy held to be re!CI'cttlt to finding of intent); Zamora 1·. :\ew 
Braunfels lt1dep. School Dist., :il'l F.~d tool C>til C:ir. lll/0) (per curiam) (noting that 
record di'tlosul '"lotlgst:tnding· scgrcgatun intetll .. d:tting hack to l~-!!0); United States 1·. 
\lidland lmkp. Sehoul Dist., 0El F.~d GO, G~ C>til Cir. 1~17:,;. cat. denied, 4~1 C.S. ~Ill) 
(l'Jiti) (c1 idcnu: of intent ranged from l~Jl~ resolution to prl>l ide ··separate school for 
\!cxic:tllS if dcmatltkd"" to drawing of attendance ZOIH'S in 1901i); \!oralcs 1·. Shannon, 
,-dli l.~d ·1ll. ll:l (:->tit C:ir.). en/. dcl!icrl. ·l:?'l C.S. 111:\1 (1'1/:">) (1'107 resolution and 19liG 
imposition uf neighborhood school policY held rclc1ant to proof P( intcnl); United 
>itatcs 1·. \!issottri. 0l:i F.~d nc;:,. 1:\70 (8th Cir.). cnt. dc11icri. ·l:.'J L.<'i. ~~:->! (lCJ/D) (finding 
tklt sclJ<,ol district 11hicil ~:) Years earlier had refused by referendum to merge 11·ith 
:til-black schuol district \\':ts guilty of ··intention:tl scgrcg:ttiun in the past·· rclc1·ant to 
11lll"thcr ettncnt in:1ction 11·as legal); Brinkman 1. Gillig~tn. :JOJ F.:!d GS·1 (Gtlt Cir. 1~17·1), 
1 c11 f["d. :>18 F.~d Si'.\ (lith Cir.). ccrt. denied, ·1~3 C.S. 1000 (1~1/:J) (holding that series 
of acti<lll.S stretching m·cr ;,o \cars constillttcrl ··cumrdatilc \iolation'" of Constitution;; 
Soria 1·. Oxnard School Dist. l~d. of Trustees. !}:-<(i F. Supp. :i:l'l, :! '1~- l:l (C. D. Cal. 1~)7 1) 
1u 11 rcm:ttltl. l9clS-l'llO school bo:nd minutes aml mitl -1'11)\Js bu:trd actions held pro1Jati1·c 
011 i;.suc of lJo:tnl"s intent). 
:<2. !11 sl:ltutorY illlcrprl'l:ttiun. ""kgislatil·c intent·· is not u.su:t!ly reduced to the sub-
jccti1c itltl'llts "r mnti1·cs of inrli1idu:tl icgi.slator.s , l!llt rather is cotln·il·cd :" :1 ch:tr:tctcr-
istic of tl\1.: ~tcliinls of legislatures as institution:;. Sec) e.g. , ~\. BICKEL, sujJHl note ~~G, at 
()','.ii3 , '!0~·10; \!:tcC:dlum. I.r·gi.,futi;'c Jntcnl, 7:'> Y\LI: L.). 151 (l'ilil1). 
:-U. The tl:ltlilt: of :t poiicy C:lllllOl be understood ,,·itltoul rdcru1cc to the options 
:11 ail:li>!c ~rr tltc time of its adoption ami tltc likr:ly clkcts of cil0osi11g those options. 
l'<~r ('\:~ttnplc, a dcci~ion to ~td(lpt a "ncigltburllood scho"~l pul is clearly a different 
decision in ~L citv u[ intcgr:ttcll ucighburhood.') tl1~Ul it is in a city ,,.JJich is residentially 
:.;cgJ·cgatcd. 
Scgrcg;1 tin: Intent ;tnd the De Facto / De Jure Dist incti on 
tutiuna l actio ns are presumed Lo fu rt her in st itut ional goal::; or pur-
poses and thm arc subjec t to a cl cllla ncl for justification in tenus o t 
t hose pu rposes. This pres umption is rooted in bo th constitutional 
and socia l th eo ry . T llc mode l oi the p!!rpuselul in stitution is im-
pli ci t in the Fott rtcemh A.mencl mcnt' s rcqu ircm en t that gove rnm ent 
actions be justifiable as "ration ally re lated '' to leg itima te o bj ec t i\ es .' 1 
:\ Ioreun:r, a substantia l b ody or social theory postul a tes a n10clcl u f 
imti tuti o tb as u nita ry enti t ies (" rationa l ;1ctors .. ) that pursue guah 
through purposdul act ion s.8 ·' 
T he purposes th at the inst itution m ay leg itimately pursue a rc limi -
ted in t\1'0 11·ays. T h ey are con strained i11ternall y by th e character o ! 
th e imtittition. i .e ., the general purposes fo r h-hi ch it n: ists, ancl c:.;.-
tcnnlly by th e lega l mandate gi\'Cll that inst itut ion.' '; Cua b n ot 11ithi;1 
t hat mandate, o r forbidd en by o ther lega l sta ndards, e<umot be legit-
im a te justif icat ions o f instit ution al ac tions. Fur example, a ;,clwol 
board co u ld n ot claim as a legitimate p ur pose the fos teri ng o f rac ial 
imbalance. 
i-\s applied to a school board , the model presumes that the board 
adopts policies in pursuance or institutiona l obj ectives. \\'here the 
sch oo l b oard adopts policies that foreseeabl y furth er an il leg it imate 
obj ec tive, and it cannot just ify or adequately expla in such po lic ies in 
terms of legitimate educa t ional objecti ves, o n e must presum e that th e 
school board mndcl not have adopted such a policy but for an i l-
legitimate pu r pose. Consistent \\·ith this perspective, "institu tional seg-
regative intent" may be said to e:.;.ist \\·here a school board ado pts a 
more, rath er than a less, segregative policy and can n ot justify its clw icc 
in te rms of legitimate edu ca tional obj ec tives> ' 
S l. Ltti ct:d Stat es Dcp't "[ .-\ g ricultu re 1·. '.Iorcn o, -1 13 L.S . :J~ S . :)~\~\ ( 1 ~ 17:] ') . Sec 
D :t n dr idgc 1 \\'illi ams. C)CJ7 L.S. '!7!. -±8;\-:'7 (10G:I ); Brest, stljHu note 1 L ;rt ! Uti ~< n.Gl. 
Th is :\nte trea t:,; tlt e legitimate n bj ccti1·es of t ltc sc ltotll board :ts ,.; ubsumcd itt tlte te rm 
"cduc tti<>tt ;tl ol>jc·ctil c'' ·" Sec p. ;U!I iufw. 
8:i. Sec C: . :\u.: so:-.:. f.sSE.'\C t oF Drc;sto'\: E:>:t 'L-\ 1'\I'\C Tilt: C: Lil .\'\ '.ltssiu: C Ktsts .J -C18 
(1971 ): :\ote. sufntl note 3 f, a t 11 00. !I Ot) .J tl (c i ring sources) . 
Sii. Sec J -Ltmpt~>tt '· \! rJ\1- .'iun \ \'o ng , % ~ . Ct. I C:U:i, l 'Jlll -11 ( 1~ 1/l i ) (lt, potltcsiz itl g 
stat e intn t·sL.s for e:-: cltHlin g 1tlicn s from c i1i! scni cc j obs , b u t limiting pn missiblc 
"intncsts" tu th ose 11· ithin n:,.;po ns ib i!it,- of :lgc·tt C\ in 1·ol1·cd ). 
S7. Th e pri nc ip le undcrhing P ro fessor Brest's empha sis ot t motil e et[itlt!h· supports 
the in sti tution:tl appro1r ch. Brest :trg ucs th:tt on e cog ttiz:tb lc com pl:t i;tt nf the c itizen 11"110 
h as bee !! d i., ;u!l:t ttl :l!,\-l'd b 1· a gmc rnmc t!l :d clcci ,.; io n inll ue ncul IJy ;t tl illeg itima te !!JOl in: 
is tlt:tt ltc· lt: ts !we n dqni; cd of !ti s o pponunit\ fnr a full, fair ;;ssessmcn t of the m e rit s 
nf th e tkci .si~>t t. Bres t. Folnt•r;u /: ! 11 ]Jcfcu sr: of !li e _·lu!irl iscri llli llll/io u Priu n',l;k , ~10 1-!.\RI·. 
I.. R~:~- . f. l :! - l 'i (l'l7G J [here inaft e r c ited as Frnnt•oulj : Brest. ,·l fi! n oach /o M otive , su jnrt 
n ote 1·1. It t llii -I C: . The salllc •kpri, ·:Jt iot! ct n IJ c 'a id t" take place 11·h e n in st itntio nal 
Lt ctors bia .s the dcci si(l ll it! 11 direc tion lllt f:tnn ablc t" minoritY asp irat i11t1s. Sec l-Lnrkins 
\'. Coktnan . :1/ti F. Supp - l 'i'iO, U :\:'i- 3fi. I:Uc< (~.D. Tc:-: _ 1 ~17- ! ) (adop t i11g n:pc rt \\itn ess 's 
tcstinto tt y t li:tL "in stitutim ta l rac is m· · col!S ists of " st :m d:nd operating p roced ures pre-
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T his approach is analogous to equal protection analysis in other 
areas: justifica tions ("state interests " or "purposes") are o ft en hypoth-
esized and used to measure a statute' s constitutionality. ss It is also 
comparable to approach es in some areas of labor s ~, and tax law,r•o 
\\·h ere the intent of an institution must be inferred. lJnions and cor-
po rat ions are presumed to pu rsue goals; and suspect act ions that cannot 
b e explained by adequate "bus iness just ifications" are treated as proof 
of proscribed in tent. 
T h e model of institutional intent resolves what, under the subjec-
tive interpretation, appears to be a paradox of the Keyes opinion. T he 
Co urt's presumption that intent continued among successive boards 
of ed ucat ion despite changes in the identity of individual members~' 1 
can be explained by the fact that the "same" institution was inYo l vecl .!'~ 
judiet:d ag-ain't . the: nc:c:rls of a pa rticular rac ial g roup"). For a n analysis o f this in-
stitutional bias at 11·o rk in sncra l se ttings see Fr iedman, In stitutional Ha ci>llt: Hu w to 
Discriminate ll'i tlw11t Ueal/y Trying, in R .\CL\L DI SCRI~!J;-;xno:-~ 1:-1 THE U:\ !T ED ST.\TI:s 38-~ 
(T. Pe ttig rew ed. l 97:i ). Sucil inst ituti o na l fa c tors a re not necessa ril Y the product of tile 
indi1·idual occ upa m s of posts o n th e school boa rd , but rather may s te m fro m the tradi-
tion s, custom, , and in for mal 11·orking patterns u[ the school board, 11hich m;t y be: stable 
over time. 
88. See, e.g., I-Llmptott v. ;\[m,· Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 , 1905-06 (197G); ·c nitcd 
States Dep't o f .-\ gr iculture ' - ;\! ore no, 413 l:.S. 528, 533-38 (1973) (il\poth csiz in g con-
g ress io nal purposes fo r excl uding ho useholds with nonrelated m e mbers fro m elig ibility 
fo r food stamp prog ra m); Fiss, Grouf>s and th e Eq ual Protec tion C/anse , 5 PHILOSO PHY & 
P en . Arr. 107, 108- 17 (1976); Tuss m a n & tenBroc:k , The Equal Protec ti011 of th e J.mcs, 
37 C:.\ LJF. L. R EV. :HI. :l:i7-58 (19 -~ 9). 
89. Sa, e.g., i'\LRl3 '. Great Dan e Trailers , In c., 388 u.S. 26, 33-34 (1967) (c: mploycr 
actio ns that h a 1c dkct of discriminating ag-ain st uni on munbcrs raise prc:s umption of 
antiunio n mo t il·atio n a nd must be justified hy "legitima te a nd s ubs ta ntial business·· 
r easons) . See generally Chri s ten sen & S1·anoe, M otive and ln ll:'nt in the Colllllliss ion uf 
L'nfa ir LaiJOr }Jractices: T he SlljJrt' lltr.: Cmnt and the Fictive For111a lit y, 77 Y.\L t: L.J. l :..'li'J 
(1968); J a nofsky, S ew Cuncef>ts in lntuference and Discrimination unrlc r th e SLH.l: T/u; 
L egacy of .\mcric lll Shipbuilding- 11/1(1 Great Dane Traikrs, 70 C.:o L c~ r. L. R EV. 8 1 ( 1~170 ) . 
90. See, e.g. , Cnitcd St ates v. Cen eres , ·!O:i C.S. 93, 104 (1971 ) (to determine ' ·domin;tnt 
mo ti ,·ation " of t: tx paver, co urt m aY \\Tig h " o bj ec ti,·e ri sk" of tran sac tio tt ;t g-a inst 
proba ble gai n ; im p licitlY ass uming profit-max imi zing beh a,·ior): sec gcnuullr J\lum , 
,\l oti1•c, I ntent, our/ PtllfHm: in Federa l ln con11: T oxut.io)J, 3-1 u. C: n1. L. R u·. -ISS (1%7) . 
Tax Ia\\· ~tl so empl o:s tile conCL'[H of subjectin~ inten t. !d. at 4~16-98 . 
~ l. Sec pp. cl:..'li -:..'7 .wjmt. 
U2. The Court's assertion that e1 ideJtCc of til e illi cit moti,ati o ns of prior seh ou l board 
officials ,,·as relc1·an r to th e iss ue of tlt c ir succc:s,ors' deci sions "where, as h ere , the: ct'e 
in1·oh ·es one sch oo l board ,' . -11 3 u.S. at ~07, :tnd it s reference to th e " boa rd's inte nt' ' as 
opposed to the int ent of th e m cmbns of Lite board, id ., ind icate til ;tt th e Co urt ma y 
han: co ncci1·ed of scgrc:g-a ti\T inte n t as ;m institutiottal rather titan a person a l charac ter-
isti c. Sec id. at ~OG ("lT!Itc Board. throu g h its ;tctions mn a period of years. inten tionallY 
created' ' segregated schools. ) Cf . L tnklo rd '. Celsto n , 3()1 F.:..'d 1 ~!7 (4 th C:ir. EIGli) (g-ra ttl-
ing prospect i1·e relid ag;t iii ' t poli ce d c: p;trtllll'IIL \\·here depa rtm e n t h;1d ex h ib ited te tHknc y 
to vio late Fo urth .-\me ndmcnt rig h ts). 
The a utho r of Ctse Comm ent , .wjno note ,-,o. a t 139, ath·:m ces th e lnpothcs is tlt:tt "Lo 
sume extent a bo ;trd mav d e1e lop an 'ins titutio tt a l itttent ,' indepc:ndcn t of board 
panicip;mts" ;ts a po" iblc ,olutiutJ to Lite apparent illog-ic of inferring int e ttl l.>ack.l,·ard 
antl fo n1·arcl atnottg- lJoanh e<>Jnpt,scd o f dif fcre JI L members. T h e Cunltl!Citt docs nut, 
hOII·e \-e r , go !Je,·mtd !to t ing that a n " imtituti un;tl int<.:nt" m;J Y arise fro m tlte influ ence u f 
long- tenured o ffi cials a 11d eiiLren clt cd procedures. / d . 
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Moreover, the Court's most recent pronouncement on the role of 
intent or purpose in equa l protection analysis supports th e institu-
tional interpretat ion of segregative intent. In JVashington v. Davis 
the Court eire\\' the distinction between the " legitimate purposes of 
[an] ordinance" and the considerations that "actually motivated" cl e-
cisionmakers .t•:; T hi s lends credence to the contention that the con-
cern of equal protection analysis is institutional, r ather than indi-
vidual, intent. 
13. A Test for Institutional Segregative Int ent 
The institu tional intent model makes an "unjustifiable" choice of 
a segTegative policy in the face o f less segregative alternatives the basis 
for a finding of segregative intent. A justi fication must be cast in terms 
of legitimate educat ional objectives. Therefore, in order to opera-
tionalize the institutional model a court must determine how the leg it-
imate educational obj ectives advanced by the school board to justify 
its choice may be impeached. 
A reasonabl e focus of this inquiry wou ld be the alternative policies 
available to the school board.:11 In some school desegregation cases, 
plaintiffs will be able to present an alternative to the policy adopted 
by the board \Vhich \\·ould better impl ement the school board 's edu -
cational objectives and result in Jess racial imbalance. If the school 
board is presumed to act to attain its educational objectives as eftec-
1!:). % S. Ct. ;1t 20'1'1 ( i11tcrprcting Fu/1111'1 v. TIIOIIIjJsull , ·lllc\ L'.S. 217 ( 1~71 )). Sec p. Ci27 
:i llfna . 
!H. One standard th~tl seYcral couns haYe adop ted in orcin to c\·aluate a schoo l 
board's justificatiOIJ> for ih segrcgatin: policies is consist ency. For imtance, an inference 
of scgrcgati\·e int ent co uld ~1rise from the adoption of a "freedom of choice pbn" in on e 
area and a neighbo rh ood school policY in ano ther, if such policies co ntributed to racial 
imbalance. Sec L nit ed States \. School Di s t. o[ Omaha, 5~ 1 1:. ~d 5'10. :)43 11.~ 8 (8 th C ir. ). 
cert . d enied, ·123 l.'. S. <JHi (197 :"• ); Olin:r "· ;\lichiga n State Btl. of Ed uc .. :iOS F.2d 17 8. 
182 -83 (6th Cir. 1!171) . CIT/. denie d. ·121 u .. ~. 9G:l (1'!75). Professor Brest also appa rentl y 
faH >rs this requ ireme nt. Brest , Forcu•uul, sujna note 87, ;l[ 2~!. The r eq uireme lll , ho\\T\·er , 
is inapprop riate. There is n o reason e ither to expec t or to require absolute consis te ncy 
from school hoards. Such a requirement is incompatible 11·ith the in st itutional nature o[ 
school administration. Schon! boards ck1nge co1nposition from n: ~tr to year , and !h e 
membership in the pre\·ailing majority ma\· ch~1 ngc from deci sion to decision. Th e 
" same" sc h oo l i )()~ lrd docs ll OI. mak e all Colllcmpo rancous. much less successi,·e , d ec is io ns. 
Often no more Clll be inferred from iltCOIJSisten cY than an alteration in co;tlitiotts or 
membership. ~!oreo\·cr, the processes of tlccisionmaking in multim ember bodies ma ;· 
gcncrate incons i.sr,:ncY. Su· K. : \RRO\\' , l~DIYtDC ,\1. \·.\J.U:s ,\~D SoC:J..\1. C:Ho tCE 2-:l :\: n. :·:, 
'16-59 (1963) ; cf. \\'~t s l;in gton ,._ D~n i s , 9li S. Ct. ~O'lO , 20:il (1976) (Stc\·ens, ]. , co ncurr ing) 
(" (GJon:nJmetJtal :1ctio ll . is frc'JllCIJtlY tile product of compromise, o f collcct.i\T clcci· 
sionmaki1tg. :11Hl (If mixed moti,·at.ion.") .\dditionall y. succcss iYe deci sions C:lll be expected 
to cha11ge in rc.sp1111 Se lo shift s in P""·cr l>:liaJJCe :tnd popul:1r support. See Keyes ,._ School 
llist. :\u. I , c>:.> l F.2d ·ll i:l . . J ~S ( lOIII C:ir. 1 ~1/ :) J . cal. ril'llin/ , ·12:1 L.S. IOGli ( l~J'/(i ) (Seth , C.J. 
co ncurring 011 rcllland). Democratic processes \\·oultl be h ~l lll S trung by a requirement of 
co nsistency. 
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tively a~ possible, it sho u ld b e in fer red t hat in r eject ing th e k:;s seg -
r egative alternat ive rh e b oard p ursu es an illegitimate objective : foster -
ing rac ial im balance. 
T hus, the mod el d iBst itutio n a l in tent can gen erate a p rac ticable 
test fo r segregati-, e int en t : H i t can be d emonstr a ted tha t th e educa-
tional objective.'> o f a schoo l board could be tter have been accompli~hcd 
thro " o·h ~llt er'Flt[v e · · ,, i t ll l t''') Fo· · r·~ e ··a !J· ] f· <eoTeo· ~ tive il''l'"'tl 't t ]J P Sl' 111 0l·) l _ t. ' a - (_ .._ ... '~~- . _,"l , , ...... ·-' · ~. _./ .l. ..... . J -'- (. .... <) ·:"l u(l .~..~ _,( ~ - .. ..... , ...... . .._ 
b oard \\· ill b e h eld t r> lL1\'e ;;.c ted " as i f ' segr egat io n had b een on e of 
i ts p urposes, an cl the consequ en t n cia l imbalance w ill be held tu knc 
r esulted fro m " segregaL~'ie i nt cnr.":J~ 
The proposed tesc cha rges rh e school board i\·i th kn ol\·]edge of aYail-
able alternati ve 1' . 1 l)L·tlc l t':) al t ( t th ei r foreseeable con sequ en ces. lt a lso c:-.:-
pects th e board tu fu rthe r iLs insti tut ion a l obj ect ives a s effec t ively as 
possible. These stanclarcb are consistent ,,·ith th e rat ional actor model, 
which postula(eS l hJ.t institu t ions a t tempt to m aximize th e ir institu -
9:3 . Such a tes t , focusing· on c l·:du a tion of a lter na t i1c;;, h as bee n hinted at bY sc1cral 
C\Ses <llld communators. Si·c t · :: i tt:d .•;tare:; 1·. T c:-:as Educ. Age n cy, :>:l~ F.~d ;180 , !lS'J ('ith 
C:ir. I9iti) , vacaterl awl !CJ!I ! IIUI !'i l ,tnT r·urinm Si l l! !Will. .-\ustin Indep. Sch ool Dist. 1·. 
l..'nitcd S tates, 45 U.S .L\\·. :1-ll :.l (U .S. Dec. li , J 'J ili) tdc jure, in k ntiollal seg regatio11 is 
that 11·hich is " fon:seca l; k <tn cl a1 o ida 1Jic") ; Cnitcd States Y. School Di s t. of O maha . 'i~ l 
r.~d :)30, :,:Js n. l :l, :1 ·10 1 1.~ 0. :> 1'.:--U (Sth C: ir.) , cc rl. d e 11 ierl . -J'.: :l C.S. 94G ( l 'J i :i) (schoo l 
ho <t rd 's control u1 e r teac her ass ig: l lll e lll. stutle11t t ransfers. ' ' P t ional attendance zones and 
school pLtccment , comhinnl ,,·i t lt aYaiLtiJilitY o f kss scgn·g·:t t il c options cons is tcll t 11·itlt 
stated ohjcctin·s. ;: cce ptcd :ts pr<>"f o[ scgrcgatil·c intent); ;'\[or alcs Y. Shannon, 5Ui F.'.:d 
411. ·11 '\ (:itll C ir. ) . cc r / . dcui cil . ·1:!'\ t:.S. JO:l4 ( EI /:i ) (foreseeab le segregatio n "i s s trong 
e1·id e ncc o[ scgrcg<: ton· int•: ll l .. ;: nd " c1·idcn ce beco m es ol·crw llelming 11·h e n cons id ered 
in ta nde m \l' it il ' ' ran til <>t <l i'<Ji la b k :dtern :.t lil '<.: " migh t \\'dl h al·e d esegrega ted (th e ! 
sc lwllls .. ); Oli 1n 1·. ,\li chi g<ll l .· t<:tc J\d . o f b lue. . :"> liK F.:ld J / ;) , l <:l '.:. 18 ! -87 (Gth Cir. 
l'JI ·l ). c~ rl. r!cn inl , - 1 ~! L .. \ . ~Hi '; ( l()i :) ) fpw"f u f .. resolute appli c<:tiun o[ r:: cially ncutr::l 
puli c ics '' ncccss~t ry tu rclnll plTS ll!l lp tion of scg rcgatiYc int c 111. fru1n foreseeabl e segrega-
tion ; failure Lo :t d P jH ~ ! \-~! iL l h lc le ss scg rcg·ati'.·c a lt tTILtli\T S p r o l.>a LiY c on iss ue o f intent ) . 
Co urts us ing a s ubjcct i \· c tes t. h:t\'c ~!lso focustlt <111 ;tl L{' rn a LiYcs . . )'ec , e .g . , 1-figg in s , ._ 
Boa rd of Educ. . :">08 j: _:.:'J l 7 / ~1, 7!i i.J (li th Cir. l' l7 - ~ ) (aiJscllce o [ : tlt c rn a t i n~s short of to ta l 
rc:-;lt uff. ling o f ~Ludc t tt assig tlt n c n ts held to lJc d cft'l lS1.' Lo pu . .:s urnption o f scgrcga ti , ·c 
i:Jtent); Stanton Y. Sctlllu ia Cn io 11 :H igh Sch oo l Dis t., ·lOt' F. Supp. :JO~. :J lli 1:\.D. Cal. 
l~17li) ,("[A]t times v;c ;nus! lu•>k IJc: hi:Hl tile sta ted justificatio ns fo r certain ~o\ C rllllll'lll 
ac tio n to asce rt ain the ·n:al li loti l·atio n' .... O fte n the · som ctl:in~ more ' is found I"· 
analn.in g altenn t i1·c courses 11·!:i ch cou ld h :11·e bee n ch ose n a nd ·,,·hi ch , ,.o tdd not ha1·c 
crea (cd ~he infc l ic i to u.s i mp <~ct co mpla ined o[ . . .") :\ nu m ber o f comm e n tato rs h ;l\·c 
;dso foc used o n al tcn ut ilc:i . Sec F iss . T h e Cho r/otlc -,\i crl:lc n/nn·g Case-Its Sig n ijiu111 u : 
fM Nu rtliern Sclwol JJn cg;cgu tion, ~ ;) U . CiiL L. R: .\. li'l/ , 70li (1'171) (s ugges ting that 
.. a,·oid a l>ilitv" shoul d i >c mc<:su rc of go1cmm <.: llt n ·sponsihilitv; ; K;nst, sujna note S, at 
395 (s ta ting. th:1t " [t] !J c inqui ry in to m o tile . . is. abmc all an inquin· into the c';-
pcctcd good to be :1cco mpii sh ed i ll· ;1 sLite 's acti (Jll. and the har m that is c :-:pcc tcd to 
;Tsult f rom it"; a n d ;; uggcst ing test th.: t \\·ould e:-: ;uninc "t he a l t.c rnati\T ch o ices that a rc 
reaso n a b lY a1·ail ablc tu ;t scil <H.'l IJo<: u l f< >r :~ n• i d i!l g c:-:ccss i1T r::c ia [ imbab!l ce··) ; '' u tc , 
Sclw ol v :·, cgu'g rt li ou .ljiir :-il\<l il Jl : :1 T l iW I'Y <.'! (;mJC /1 1/il/ ' 11 / Ji cs j!(JII Si lJi/it y, :lU C. C:!i!. 
l.. Rrs. -}~!, ·J Jll (\ 'l ·i ~ ) (su.c;g'"t in g th:;t "[tjilc appropriate ~ L.tmLtrd ~lwuld IJe til<tt 
r cspo mibilitY at t< tci: cs. n'g:trd lcss uf .: c tual intellt , \\·here a sc hoo l bo.:nl Ltil s to t-.:mcch· 
a 1·o id abl c raci a l im l>;ti:t ll cc .. J. 
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tional goals.~ 6 furth ermore, it is n o t unreasonabl e to charrre a oov-
o 0 
ernment institution ,,·ith an obligation to pursue its institutional man-
date vigcn uusl y. ! J ~ 
In applying the itt stiLutiOttal intent test, th e court sho uld treat "ecl-
ucttiunal ul)j ectivcs .. as incluclittg concerns ol cost ur ellici cttc: as ,,·ell 
as th e m o re o bvio us objectives of education a l quality, bo th cognitive 
and a !Jectivc. and pupil safety. ''' Th ere arc, Jw ,,·e,· cr, comtraints upon 
the objectives that tlt c boarclmay advance ::ts justifi cations. Th e wei ght 
that a co urt 11·o ttlcl a_ tt;~c h to proposed obj ec tives ,,·o ulcl b e de termin ed 
by th e educa ti onal mancbte o ( the school autlwriti es ~ ' '' and other legal 
stand ards. Fo r exampl e, a sch ool board could n o t leg it imately fav or a 
"neighborhood schoo l policy"' if su c h;~ policy ~~· otdcl contran~n e a st::tte 
law commanding int.egration. 1 0 " Furthermore, su long as black schools 
are educati onally inferior to 11·hite schools, an att empt to justi fy segre-
gative choices as furthering the quality o f educati on in the white 
'JG. Sec :\ o te . Sll jna n o tt: !H. at 1100-01 & nn. 3~J. ·II (c iting sources) . Cf. t; nit ed S ta tes 
v. Fals taff Bn: 11 ing Co., ·110 C.S. 52(), :,riG, :!G8 -W, 570 (197'1) 1\br,; lnll. J., co ncurring) 
(assuming that co mpany 11·i!l act in its ecmwmic ,;clf-intnest to Ill:lximize profits). 
97 . Indeed, som e s tates impose by bw th e d ut y to pmsuc cduc ttional g oa ls diligentl y. 
See, e .g ., Root , .. :\onhcrn Ca mbria School Di ,; t., 10 Pa . Cmm11·. C t. 17 1. 179. 309 A.2d 
l7'i, li S ( 1')73 ) (int c rpretitt g Pcnnsvll"ania Comtitution to require that .. [t)h e decisions of 
school boards ... be IJ ~tse cl solely on cotJ>idcration for the people's int e rest in a 
thorou g h ami effi cient S\ >lC lll of edu cation' } 
The expcoa t.i o n imbedded in th e in s titutional intent tes t tktt sc hool boa rds ,· igoro us ly 
pursue legitima te objcctin:s goes bev<md a requirem ent that hoards m e re ly state a 
purpose for th e ir actions. This stric te r stan(l;tnl is anal ogous to 11·hat Professor Gerald 
Gunth e r identifi es :ts an emng itt g principle in equal protec tio n :111 :t h .si.s. H e a.s,;nts til:t t 
the Burger Co urt h a,; IJcg lltt tn appl y an equal prot cc tin u st and a rd o f r :H io nalit y to 
governm ental ac tio ns that requires s ig nificautly more tlt :111 a minima )[\· ratio nal relatio n-
ship to some co ncciYablc go ycrnm cnt objccti\'C. G. CL·.s;ntER, C.\ .I FS .\'>D ;\f.YfFRI.\LS ON 
hoi \ tD t.:.-l r. Rt CHTS 1 s; C:oNsTtn:r:o:\ .. 11. L1 w ~ :-i~J. (i l , ~80 - 88, -!G ti -1~ (~d ed. EJ/ (i) . Sec Cra ig 
, .. Bo re n , ·l'i L.S.L."·· -1057 (U.S. D ec. :..'U, 1~/G) . 
98. See Stan to n , .. Sequo ia Cnion High Sch ool Dist.. ·!OS F. Supp . 502 (:\.0. Cal. 1976) 
(deci sio n to clmc black ltig·lt sclwol :.llld bus only black s tudents held comtitutional o n 
grouud th:tt thi s 11·as clea rl Y leas t c:-: p e ns i1·c altcrnatii"C ~1\ · ailablc) . 
99 . Cf. Hampton , .. ;\l o 11· Sun W o ng, 9G S. Ct. 18%, 1909-11 (19 /G) (lto lding th a t 
actio n s of Ci1·il Scnice C:ummission could not be just ifi ed bY rde rct1 cc to l'resirlc ut"s 
foreign affairs po11-cr, since allow:tbl e jttstifications 11-crc confined to C:umnti ss ion"s leg a l 
manda te) . This principl e has n o t been expli c itl y appli ed in sch oo l l itiga ti o n , alth o ug h 
some co u r ts h a ,·e a ,;s um cd th:t t til e jus tifi cation s aYail a b lc to sch ool boards fo r th e ir 
actions arc limited to lcg itim:ttL: educational inte rests. Sn: 1\crke lman , .. S:ut Franci sco 
Cnifie cl School Di st. , SOl F.:.\1 12G-l , l:..'u7, l:..'ti 8 ( ~ltlt Cir. 1 ~171 ) . 
100. For s tate po li c ies dircct ittg in teg ration , sec , e.g .. 11.1 ... \ :-.::-;. ST.IT. ch. 12:..' , § 10-2 1.3 
(S mith·l-Imd Supp. llJ/o); i\ 1.\ss . .-\:\N. L.\11·s eli. !:-, , ~ II ( \l ic lt ic j Lt l,- . C:o-np Supp. 1976); 
Uniontomt Area Sc hool Dist. \". Pcnn sYhania Uunt:ln R e la tions C:uiilln·n, ·155 Pa. 52 , 3 1;) 
.\.2d };)(j ( 1'17 ~\ ) (uplwlclitt g :Hiministratilc intcrprcl:ltion of PctlllS\h :Lni:t ll••m:tn R e b -
t io m .-\ ct, 1'.\. ST.\T .. \N N . t i t. 1'1. ~ ~) ,-, :i ( i )( l ) (Purdon l~Ji j I :( SttpJi. 1 ~ 1/li ). 11 lti clt :lltllOUil CL"> 
.maximum permiss ible clc1·ia tiun in an y schoo l fro m O\T rall racial co mpos it io n of sch ool 
distric t) . 
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schools 1\'0Ldcl run afoul of equal protection analysis elating back to 
·'separate but equal." 1 U1 
Tl1e application of this test 1s clear ''hen the school board chooses 
a segregative policy in preference to a policy that better fulfills every 
stated educational objective o[ the school board. Since a school board 
is presumed to act to attain its objectives as effectivel y as possible. its 
choice of the more seg-regative alternative is inexplicable except m 
terms o[ "segregative intent." 10 ~ 
J() l. The principle that scp~tratc educational facilities must at kast pn)\·idc equ~tl 
StTdces for lJL!cks 11·as est~th!ishnl as e~trly as l\!issouri ex rd. Caiucs ,._ c~ut~tch. 'lU:J U .S. 
:U7 (l'lc\0). and SIITatt \. I'aintn, 'l3 ~1 U.S. 629 ( l9SU). More r-ccenth·. courts h:l\e held it 
ttn cotJStitutional for public edttcttion:tl sYstems to prO\·ide :tpprecial>h lm1n lc1el s ot 
scr1 ices to minoritY schooLs. Bnmn , .. Board of Educ., 38G F. Sup]). 110 , 122-2! ('\.D. Ill. 
1'174 ) : '\:tl<>tt~t!J:th '· Board of Educ., :l:J:) F. Sttpp. 7lG, 72-l (D.:\. :'-lex. l'J73) (altem :ttilc 
gro und) ; H obson , ._ Hansen, ~ti'l F. Supp. ,lUI, 49G-97 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sui! n o nz. 
Smuck , .. Hobson, 4US F.~d 17:) (D.C. Cir. l9G9) (en bane). At least one court has held 
that adopting assignment pattern resulting in blacks attending noticeablY inferior schools 
constitutes c1·idcnce of a dual system prcsurnptiiTly mandating desegregation. Rcrry ,._ 
Sc hool Dist., 505 F.~d :! ciS (tith Cir. 1974). :\one of these cases \\·et-c questioned in \\'ash-
in g ton 1. Davis, 'J(j S. Ct. 20-10 (1976). 
The ckscgreg·ation case la11· has also made it clear that the school boarcl may not take 
into account pri1ate desires for segregation, or possible disorders that might result if 
those d esires arc not fulfilled. Sec Cooper\. Aaron, 3S8 U.S. I, IG (195S). Similarly, the 
possibilitY of .. ,,.hite flight " as a justification for rejecting intcgrati\T options \\'Ottld 
require· searching scrutinY. The recognition of 11·hitc flight as a justification for ab-
juring integration cffcctil·e!y allo11·s \l'hite parents to Ycto all integration, and com-
munitY opposition has been explicitly rejected by the Court as a legitimate ground for 
Ltiling to illlegrate. !d. l\!me01cr, a policy explicitly keyed to :noid ll'hite flight can 
amplify the stigmatizing effects of 11hitc flight by comeying the mess:tge that opposition 
to integration is legitimate and that attendance at schools \\'ith minorities is undesirable. 
A final consideration militating :tgainst 11·hite flight as a legitimate justification is the 
cottsidnabk scltoLtrh· skepticism as to its existence. See Pettigt'l'll. & Green, Seh oul 
Dncgregotiun i11 Lorge Cities: ,1 CriliijliC of the Colnttiill "lr!tilc Fliglt t" Th esis, -Hi 
H11n. Eun:. Ru. l (1'1/ti ); l'ettigrc11· & Crccn , Letter, iii. at:!~::>; Rossell. Sclwol JJ n cgu;ga-
tiou a11d !! '!til e Fliglt t , ~10 l'ot.ntc.\L Set. Q. Gl:! (EJ/6). But sec Coleman, Letter , clG H \RI'. 
Li>L<:. Rt\. 217 (1'1/ l.i) . Courts should he alert to options a1·ail:thlc to school hoards that 
might coutttcrh:tLtttce the effects of 11·hite flight, such as a "magnet school" concept or 
stLitcgic placing of dcsirabk courses. 
102. Such cases \\·ill gcncr;zlly occur \\·here Yarious altcrnatin:s L'Xist 11·itlt respect to 
~ l ttcnd:tltCc zone IJUundaries , marginal adjustments in pupil p!:tccmettt pl:t1ts , :llld the 
.s ititlg- of tte11· :,c!tools. These :tltent~tti1cs may result in 1·arying allltltttrts of r:tci:tl im-
b:tl:tttce 1et IJc dfectin:h· indisti11guis!table on t!tc basis of cducation:tl and cost nitcri~t. 
Hmi'Cicr, if it cut be slrm1·n t!tat the maintenat!Ce of racial imbalance cdttc:ttionally hcnms 
minoritY students, t!ten, ce teris j)(trilms, the board must choose tire lc:tsl segrcg:ztil'l' 
option. Fact situ:ttiuns i11 \\'lticlr a school board \\·as f:tu·d 11·itlr eYidencc of t!te lr:tnn-
I(tlttc·ss of segTcgation ~1nd :111 arraY of otlrcn1·isc educati o nally cqui1alcnt altcrnatiiTS arc 
pn·sL·ntt·d i11 H ctll , .. C:otnmunitl· .'icltool Bd. of Educ. , clS3 F. Supp. li~l'l , 71:>-IG, Tl'l-40 
1'i .D.'\. \ ·. 1~17-IJ. iljf'rl . ,->]~ F.:!d ;;7 (~d C:ir. ]Cl7:-, ) . and Petta , .. Stq)('rior C oull: ,-,o C: tl . 
. \pp. :hl !5:11, li~i7- ' I'J . 12:\ Ctl. Rptr. :)011, 502 (l<J/0) . 
htrtltnmurc, \\·hen t!tc choice :lllwng otltcrll·ise cquiY:tlcnt alll'l'lt;ttin·s is present ed , if 
t!tc sclt<"d l"'~ud is UtHlcr ~~dutY to integTatc IJcc:tu sc of state l:t\1·, sn: 11otc 100 sujnu , the 
kast sq;rc·g~lliYe action \\ou!d also IJc uncquiH>callv superior. Such legal duties arc often 
ptL·scttt. F.g. , Di:tr 1. S;ttt .J ose Cttifiul School Dist., 'll~ F. Supp. cl iO, :>21i-~S ('\.1) , Cal. 
1'1/li) ; Hoots 1. 1'ettttS1h:lllia , 'l:!'J F. Supp. 807, SEl-~0 (\\' .D. Pa. 1'17:\) . uf'f'utl rlislllisserl, 
J~l:'i F.'!d IU'f• (C\d C:ir.y, ccrt. r!cllil'll, 11~1 L: .S. SSJ (197!). 
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In the usual case, the school board is faced with vanous courses of 
action, each of 1\·hich furthers different educational objectives to vary-
ing degrees. For example, the choice of a school site 1\·hich decreases 
racial imbalance may further the educational objective of decreasing 
total student travel time. Selection of a different site may cost less , 
yet be more segregative and have no salutary effect on tra\·el time. 
The court lmulcl be faced 1\'ith the task of balancing the costs incunecl 
and educational obj. ectives achieved by alternatives resultino· in dil-, D 
fering proportiom of racial imbalance. The existence of institutional 
segregative intent lmulcl be clear, hcm·ever, it the net educational mer-
its of a segregative choice are sig·nificantly lessH':; than those of an in-
tegrative alternative. 101 
In balancing actual against potential school board actions, comts 
sometimes confront situations in 1\·hich a school board has chosen 
among educationally equivalent alternatives. In such a case, the board 
may claim that since it had no educational grounds for rational choice 
bet\\·een the alternatives, the choice 1\·as unavoidably made on the 
basis of fortuitous factors ancl no further justification should be re-
103. The requirement o[ "'igni[icanl" imbalance in educational merits is a functi<111 
of the necessary imprecision of adjudication. In many cases, the educational merits \\·ill 
be so closely b:danced that the case 11·ill require deference to the C\'aluation of the sehoul 
IJo:n·d. Insofar as changing the status quo entails administratiYe costs, a failure to change 
existing poiicics \\·ill prO\e justifiable in most marginal cases. 
10-l. It Gill he argued that couns arc not competent to 11-cigh the rclatii'C desiraiJilit1· 
of educational optio11s. \\.eighi11g· questions of fact and duty is, hol\.ei'Cr, a classic lunctiou 
of courts; i11 both e<>ltstillltional :tnd 1\0nconstitutional cases, courts ha1·e eYaluated the 
technical merits of altcrnati1cs ill educational situations. E.g., Lau L :\iclwls, 414 U.S. 
::>Gel, Stili-Go (1'!7-l) (holding that Chinese ·spc:tking studelllS 11-cre not afforded statutorily· 
mandated educatio11al oppurtullities equal to those pro1·ided other students \\·hen classes 
\\'Cl'C conducted in English); Wisconsin 1·. Yoder, ·lOG U.S. 205, 221-22 (I '!7:2) (in challenge 
to compulson schooliug· based on alleged impingement on free exercise of religion, court 
assessed Yaluc to student uf t11·o Years of high school education); ;\Ic:\eal 1·. Tate C:otnll) 
School Dist., :·,uo F.2d 1017, 101 11-20 (:>tit Cir. El/5) (Fifth Circuit wle is that grouping 
students acconling· to aiJility 11·ith result of classroom racial imbalance will be permitted 
in othcr11·ise unitary school system unll' if "the school district can demonstrate that its 
assignment method is not based on the present results of past segregation or 11·ill remech 
such results through bettn educational opponunitics"). It is certainly not clear that 
courts arc less competent to weigh educational considnations than they arc to prul.Je the 
innn 11·orkings of a bureaucracy or the minds of bureaucrats in a search for illicit 
nwtil·ation under the subjcctin~ test. 
Courts lt ;nc engaged in si Ill i Ia r c1·;d ua lions in areas outside of ccluca tion. F.g., Dcan 
:\Iilk Co. Y. City o[ .\laclison, 310 L'.S. 31'1, :l51-:ili (1~151) (assessing a\ailalJilitl· and 
dfccli\l'lll'.SS of :t!innalin· health b11·s 11·hich ii'Ot!ld not burden interstate commcrcl'); 
L'nitcd .~t:ttt·s '· Cllloll To11ing Co .. lYI F.2cl lri'l. 17:1 (2d Cir. 11117) (L. Ham!. J.: ill 
determining ncg·ligTncc , court must balance proiJaiJilitv u( harm and gra,·ity o[ harm 
ag:1imt cost of :t\<licling harm ). Sec gcncm/1\' C:h:tmiJcrs, .lltnnalivcs to Civil Couuni/})!cll/. 
of til e :\Icnta/1\' Ill: l'raclicol Guides (/))(/ Cunstitutiunol 1)//Jn-rativcs, 70 .\[!Cit. L. RLY. 
1107 (lUi~): \\·ormuth ,\: .\iirkin, Tile Doctrine of tile l!cusunau/c :lltcnwtivc, '! l'T.\tt. L. 
REV. 25! (196!). 
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quirec\Y' ·' The test de\·clopecl above does not n:solve th e iss ue, sin ce 
the test is concerned with choice u[ the eclu cztt ionally superior ztlterna-
tivc. The deFense of ·'fortuitous cho ice," h o \\·evcr, should noneth eless 
be rejec ted. Since sc hool administrators are likely to knoil· the neigh-
borhoods il·ithin their system and be a\1·are o[ the racial consequ ences 
of th eir actions . trul y "colorblind'' choices appear an imposs ibility. 1 '"; 
The choice bet\\·een more and less segTegative alt ernatives is thus al-
ways a deci sion to maintain or oppose segregation. The sta te shou ld 
not be able to choose a more segregative alternative absent so lll e 
legitimate goa l served by th e choice . 
The proposed test for institutional inten t avoids the obj ection s to 
the til·o interpretations current in the case law. In contrast to th e 
forese eability test, th e model o f ins titutional iment may allow justifi -
cation for foreseeably segrega tive act ions. T his in turn means that 
the distinction between de fac to and de jure segregat ion is retainecl. 10 ' 
The proposed test for institutiona l intent also differs from the ~u b-
jective test in several respects . A finding of institutional segregative 
intent requires n either proof of, nor inquiry into, the subjective in-
tent of individual clec isionmakers. Such evidence is irrelevant: if school 
board actions lack objec tive justification, they cannot be defended by 
!05. See Ely, supra note !4, at 1230-35 , 1289-98 . Pro.fessor Ely a rgues that in sel ec ting 
bounda ries , patterns of tea cher placeme n t, and school construc tio n , schoo l boards a rc 
often forced to choose among alternatives that arc no t meaning fully differe nt. There-
fore, h e asserts, choices in these areas should be immune to d emands fo r justification 
unl ess plaintiffs adduce c1·ide ncc of illicit moti,·a tion. But compare Mathe ws 1·. Di az, 91i 
S. Ct. 1883 (1976), in " ·hich the plaintiff. an alien , cha llenged the five-yea r r eside ncy 
r eq uirement for medicue e lig ibility. T he Court stated: 
Since it is obv ious tha t Congress has 110 const itu t io na l duty to pro1·ide all aliens 
with the welfare ben efits pro1ided to citi ze ns, th e party challenging th e constitu-
tionality o( the partic ul ar line C:o ngTcss has dra\\·n has the bualcn of ad1·a ncing 
principled reaso ning that "· ill at once in ,·a lidatc th a t lin e a nd yet tolerate a differen t 
line separating some alie ns from others . 
Jrl . at I S~l:Z-9:1 (emphasis in original ). The Court did t-.ot limit such "princ ipl ed r easo n -
ing" to a sho\\· ing of illic it m oti1at io n . 
l OG. See p. :>:10 Sllfna; cf. Cousiii o; 1. Cit y of Chicago, -Jtjli L:Zd 8:10, 8:)5 (7th C ir. ), 
cat. denied, 409 U .S. S93 (1972) (S tevens, J., dissentin g : 1oting boundaries " ine1·itabl y 
refl ec t .. . a\\·a rcness of .L\Toup in ten.:s ts' } c\!m-colcr. ,,·here a se ries of actions, eac h 
justi fiable as " ra ndom,'' co nsistently creates or perpet uates racia l se paratio n , the cla im 
that th ese cho ices liTre in fact m ade :tt ran do m becomes signifi ca ntly less credible. Cf. 
.-\rnos \'. Hoard of Schoo l Directors , ·lO fl F. Supp. IIi:), 819 (E.D. Wis. 1076) (11·here sc hool 
board ex plainetl racial imha!aiJce as fo rtuito us result of 1alid poli cies, court stated: "It is 
hard to belie l'l: that ot!l of :Ill th e tkcisions made by school :1ttth oriti es ... 01-cr a 
twent y-year period, mere chance r es ulted in th ere be ing almos t no d ecis ion that r esulted 
in th e furthering of integ rat io n. ") 
107. For examp le, th e :1tloption "f a set of bountl:ll·,· litu·s \\·h ich for cseeably led to 
racial imbalance but "·hich clear!\' minimitcd transport:Ition cost 11·ordtl be unquestionably 
unaccepta ble und er the fo reseeahili tl' tes t. O n the ot her hand , under a tes t for ins titu-
tion al intent th e choice might 11·cl! be justi fiable, abse nt couitter balancing ed uca tional 
ubj ect in.:s . 
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tes timon y reg·arcling th e motivations of individual schoo l officials. 
Conversely, a court that utilizes a tes t for institutional segregative in-
tent \\·ill not find itsel f unfairl y invalidating objectively ju stifiab le 
actions on the basis o f th e thoug hts or \wrcls o f. a single public o ffi cial. 
~lost importantl y, since a fincliu g uf intent does n ot depend on 
inferences concerning the states o f mind of individuals, th e way is 
open to d evelop n.pli cit standards to g tticlc courts and litigants. Sin ce 
controversy ,,·o ulcl center on th e rel ati ve edu cat ional m erits o [ avail-
able options, the c:-.:perti se, and n ut th e dem eanor, of witnesses ,,·oul d 
determin e th e ,,·eigh t th a t courts wo uld gi·v·e tes timony. F urthermore, 
th e instituti onal test prO\ iclcs a framework for analysis th a t requi res 
eva luation o t the eHccts of, and justiLi catiuns for, schoo l board acti ons. 
A ppell ate courts ,,·ill t l1ll s be better able tu rev ie\\· tri a l court find-
ings, since all the elem ents pertinellt to the lo \\·er court 's cl etenuin a-
ti on will b e explicit in the record . Finally, unpredictab ility and in-
consistency o f decisions under th e subjective tes t can b e avo ided. By 
focusing on concrete polic ies aitd alternatives, the proposed test per-
mits the evolution of uniform standards for inferring segregative 
intent. 
C. Application of th e T est 
The application of the proposed standard for institution a l intent, 
and the ways in which i t may be expec ted to differ from the subjective 
and foreseeability tes ts, can b e illu strated by an examina tion of a 
simplified version of th e fact situ a tion in Dia: v . San j ose V Ilifi ed 
School District. 1 0 s 
1. The Facts 
The San] ose Board of Education adhered to a " neighborhood school 
policy" ' that assigned stud ents to sc hools in the immedia te vicinity 
of their homes. Althoug·h significant growth and demographic chang·e 
had occurred in the district , the board had att empted to keep b oun-
dari es of attendance zones constant, except wh ere new schools were 
es tablished to relieve overcrowding. T he board had n oted that over-
crowding was educationally harmful. 
A t the time of the suit , most of the schools in the sys tem ·were 
either dispro portionately Anglo or disproportionatel y M exican-Ameri-
can. The board had issued in l 96 2, and period ically affirmed, a sta te-
108 . ·112 F. Supp. 310 (?\ .D. Cal. 197G). Wil en tile fac ts set fo rth in tex t diverge from 
those in Dia::., th e actual bets of tile case will be no ted. 
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ment that this segregation \\·as "inherently harmful."H>:> In addition, 
since l DG2, the state educational regulations had required school 
boards to "avoid as far as practicable'' attendance zones that establish 
or maintain ethnic seorcoation· in l ()()9 the rccrulations were amended 0 u ' '- - L"t 
to assign a ''high priority" to the prevemion and elimination of racial 
imbalance. 11 u The regulations \lerc silent as to the propriety of ''neigh-
borhood schools.'' 
In 1971 \\'ashington Elementary School \\·as damaged by an earth-
quake, ancl pursuant tu state law the board razed the weakened struc-
ture.111 Before the earthquake, 70 ol the student body or \Vashington 
School had been l\J exican-Americ:an, and the school had been over-
crm,·decl. The board \l·as forced to decide \l·hether to rebuild \\'ash-
ington or to disperse its stt'dents to two neighboring elementary 
schools. Both schools had under 20% Mexican-American enrollment; 
each was located one mile from the \Vashington site and had substan-
tially underutilized classroom space. 
In making its decision, the board consulted the \Vestinghouse Learn-
ing Corporation, which recommended dispersing students to contig-
uous schools. \Vestinghouse suggested several plans, each of which 
would have significantly increased racial balance. 11 ~ The school board, 
however, rejected all of the proHered proposals. It decided to rebuild 
\Vashington as it had been before, leaving all schools racially im-
balanced and \Yashington overcrowded. At trial, the plaintiffs claimed 
that this decision constituted an act of de jure segregation on the part 
or the board. Board members testified that they did not consider the 
impact of reconstruction on existing ethnic imbalance, but rather ad-
hered to a policy of maintaining neighborhood school districts. 
2. The Tests Applied 
A court would locus on cliHerent facts m the present case depending 
upon the interpretation of segregative intent it adopted. An analysis 
based on the subjective test would look to the credibility of the testi-
mony of school officials. In the face of testimony by board members 
that they had uniformly applied a policy of preserving existing neigh-
109. !d. at 31:). 
110. ld. at 3~7. These n:gulatium \\tTc suspcmled from c\Iarch 17 tu JttllC ~:), I<J70, 
strengthenecl on .\Lirch ·!, l~J/:2, ~111d repealed on :\oYembcr 7, Eli~. 
Ill. Sen:ral other schools i11 S~111 Jose \\TIC also \\Takcncd IJ;; the earthquake, and 
;;cn:ral more failed to meet the lle\\·, ;;uict s1~1te standards for structur~d solidity. The 
deci.sions concerning these schools \\·ere also lTYiCII"Cd l>y the district court, but for the 
s;Ike uf clarity, the example focmcs on only one decision. 
II~. The opinion docs 110t list the det~1ils of the "'estingiiUuse t-ccummembtiom, but 
merely refers to "dispcrs~tl." !d. at cll9. 
344 
Segregative 1 ntcnt and the D e Facto , De .J urc Dis tinct ion 
borhood schools, it would be difficult for a co urt to infer that th e 
board had "intentionally discriminated agains t minority students by 
practicing a deliberate policy of racial scgrega tion.'"lD In fact, th e 
court in Diaz, u sing a subject ive intent test. foun d n o violation of the 
Fourteenth Amenclm entY 1 Had the cou rt mecl the foreseeab ility test, 
analysis \\·oulcl have ceased \vh en it bcc.1me clear that t he boarcl"s 
choice to r eb uild \Vashington Sc hool hm:seeab ly ma inta ined ethnic 
imbalance . .i\o evaluation of th e "neighborhood school policy"' \\"O ul d 
have been necessary. 
Analysi s under the inst itutional test fo r segregative intent, in con-
trast , wo uld have centered on th e educa t ional merits of the decision 
made and on alternative policies . T he board \\ould be call ed upon to 
justify i ts decision to rebuild \Vashington in the fa ce o f several iden -
tified less segregative choices. I ts just ification- maintenance of: "n eig·h-
borhoocl schools"- would be \\·eighed agaimt the meri ts of tbe alter-
natives. T h e court would note the following facts: ( l ) th e state h ad 
mandated that a "high priority" be given to the integra tion of th e 
schools; (2) the school board had previously recognized that segrega-
tion is educationally harmful; (:)) independent experts had r ecom-
mended the less segregative alternatives; (4) the option chosen by 
the board r esulted in overcrowding, a cond ition that the board h ad 
previously deemed educationa lly harmful ; and (5) the proposed 
options that the board rejected involved no long-distance busing Ill-
consistent with the stated policy of "neighborhood schools."1 L' 
1 I:i. ! d . at :rw (c mpil :1s is dele ted) (quoting·. :1s colltro llitlg . .Joi llhon , .. .'i:1tt F r;I JJ Cisco 
L·nificd School Dist., :iOO F.:!d 3-19, :L·d (~lth Ci r. 1'171 )1 . 
ll·L Th e finding of n o intent mav :trguaiJ \v IJc :tttrilnttnl to pare ntal pressures: til e 
coun foutHl that the board 's ' ·decision rdlcctcd the rl c m:tJHl of loca l pare nts." ' I d. at 
:1 18. H o11·cn-r. it ,; co n st it utio n a l an a] y,; is ,;cc m cd to hitl g·, . on th e pc r mis,;ih ilitv of th e 
"" tteigh l>< •rhood sc h ool poli cy ." ! d. a t :;;i l. Fu nilcr nw rc. it. is unclear to ,,·hicll p a re ntal 
dem; tn <h tile bo ard r espollllcd . CullljJIIu: id . at :l i t' ("" .'ip: tni sh-su m ;u ncd co mmunity prcs-
,; mcd fur rebuild ing o f [W ashing to llf .. J ;citlt id . :tt :; J ~I ("" "\ltho ugh th e board consid ered 
pLttiS to cha11 ge IJouncl:tri es [so as to tr;m sfc r ilfcxi c:t n -:\lll c ricatJ st ud c tlls from \V ash -
ington to Ri1·ng lct1 j for SCITra l \< ::trs, it nLtitJt:tinnl th e existing litt L·s in the Li ce u[ 
oppos i t io n [rom Ri 1crglcn p3 rc nts .' ·) 
11 5 . T h e te rm ·' neig hborh ood sch oo ls pol icy" is :11nhig uou s. It can r efe r to poli cies o f: 
I ) dra11·ing nt:llltlatory a tte nda n ce bnund :tri es :dong- g-co~ raphica l litt es in "'comp act'" 
districts; 
:!) dra11·ing such geog raphi c3 l hound :tri cs so as to lllittimi ze the tot :d distance tr:ti"Clcd 
by students or to maximi ze the sa[l"l,. o[ students; 
3) d ra11·ing su ch gcogr:1p h ica l boundari es so :ts to a l lo\1· p:trL" tltal p:tnicipatio n lr> main-
taining :1 tn :~x imnm dis ta nce that p arents ;ll!d ,;t ud cnts lll :ty tr:11el to sch oo l; o 1· 
4) dr a11·in g; geog raphi ca l bo undari es so ;IS to Ct> rrcspond to cxis t·ing ""ne ig hb o rh oods" ' in 
o rder tu :tssurc the cxistCII CC of a ··colll!lllltli tY"' lU control the sehoul. 
Therefore. to ascnLtin 11·h ct hn dispns: tl cot1f!icts 11·ith the poli n ·. the court lllli St 
id e ntify 11·hich o f the.sc polici es the board ll': t.s pursuin g. T his 11·as app:t J"C tlth· not done 
in Dia:. The c;; amplc in tc;;t ass urn cs th :tt tra1cl di st: IIJ Ccs o f o ne llli\c or less arc co ll -
s is tc nl ,,· ith t he go;d s of an y o [ the n c i~h ! Jo r l wml ,;c hoo l po l ic ies . 
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In this sttuatton tt seems clear that the board 's choice \\·as educa-
tionally inferior to several available less segregative alternatives. Under 
the proposed test , therefore, the actions of the board 1\·oulcl be held to 
have resulted from segregative intent and hence to constitute d e jure 
segreg·ation. 
II I. Institutional Intent and the function of th e 
De Facto / De Jure Dist inction 
The Supreme Court's adoption of ;<segregative intent" in J.:eycs did 
more than identify a technical doctrinal term: it authoritatively es-
tablished the de facto j dc jure distinction , thereby allo\\·ing fm the 
e:-;.istence o( racial imbalance in public schools i\·hich \\'CHtld not of-
fend the equal protection clause. Accordingly, th e term ;<segregative 
intent ' ' must be interpreted not only with an eye to logical consistency 
but also in light of the reasons that apparently lie behind the Court 's 
retent ion of the de facto j de jure distinction. 116 
A. The Question of Harm 
One important ground for retammg the distinction between per-
missible and impermissible racial imbalance may 1vell be the per-
ception that some instances of racial imbalance do not impose sig-
nificant harms. \Vhere the racial imbalance produces no hann,n• 
or where remedying minimal harms would entail massive desegrega-
tion costs, 11 s a finding of a constitutional violation seems less justi-
fiable.nn Accordingly, segTegative intent may be viewed as a m echa-
JIG . For di sc ussions of the policies behind the de facto / de j11rc dist in ctiOl l. sn:, e.g ., 
Diamond, sujna note 3; l'iss, Ha cial llllbala nce, sujna no te :J; Goodman , su jna n ote 3. 
Goodman is a primary defender of the distinction. 
117. See, e.g. , Bell, Serving Tw o Masters: Integ1·ation Ideals !lll d Clieut Inter ests in 
Sch ool IJnegu:gat iun Litigation , 8:"1 \' .\I.E L.J. 4i0, 479 (19/G); Fis.s. Th e }urisjnudcnce of 
Bus ing, 39 L\11. & Co:->TD.!P. l'Roll ., \\'inter 1975, at 19·1, 200-0 ;J. For the m os t rece nt n:-
,·ie\\·s of the exp anding literature on the educa tional dfens of seg regation in sc hoo ls, sec 
:\. ST. JoH:->, ScHOOL DLS EC: REG.\TI0:-1 0LTCO~It:S FOR CHII.DRD: (l~J7'i); Cohen, The Effec ts 
of Deseg1·egalion On Race Relations , 39 L.111' &: Co:>~TE\11'. PROll. , Spring 197:), at 271; 
Epps, The l llljJIICl of Sclwol JJe.\ egrcga t ion on Aspiratious, Self-Con rejJ/5 and O t h er 
.·lsjll:cts uf PersonalitY, irl. <It 300; Goodman , sufna n o te 3, at 40t. ;l5; Weinberg. T/11: Rela-
tionsliifJ JJetwan School Desegregation and :lradc111ic .•lcllicvc lll enl: .·1 Hcview of t/u; 
li nearch. 3~J L.1w &: CoxTL\11'. l'ROil. , Spring 1975 , at 2-10. 
li S. l'i ss , sujna note 117, at 195·20·1. A finding of " dua lity'' in a school sys tem requires 
the e limina tion of segregatio n "root ami branch. " Green , .. Coulll y School Bd. , 3'J I U .S. 
·130, 437-38 (1968). i\fon::onT , under !\eyes, a finding of de jure seg regati o n in any pan 
of a school system creates a stmng presumption of systcm-11·idc duality. T l1us, the oc-
cas ion of the urigin:tl finding of de jure segregation may be the coun's primary op-
portunity to n :: [mc a Temedy \\·h ere the magnitude of harms 1,·ould n o t "·arrant c:o;.· 
tcnsi\·c desegregation. 
119. See Fiss, sujna note 117, at 195-~0-1; Goodman, Slljna note 3, at :280, 2'JS-'JG. 
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msm by which courts can cl istiugu ish bet\\·cen harmful (de jure) a nd 
nonhannful (de facto) raci a l imbalance. Il so, the test for segregative 
intent sho uld be sens iti ve to the potenti a l for both the dignitary and 
educa tional harms r esulting from rac ial separation. 
l. Dignitary Harm 
One type of h a rm all eged to res ult fr om racial imbalance is digni -
tary harm- th e "living ins ult' ' of segrega tion. L!IJ In Brown the situa-
t ion that inflic ted stigma involved sta te offic ial s' consc ious separation 
of black school children from \1 hite. 1c 1 At first blush, therefore, the 
subjective test for segregative intent appears an appropriate m easure 
o f dignitary harm: it co u ld id ent ify situati ons where, as in Bro <e n. 
clecisionmakers had consc iously cll(lscn to segregate schoo ls . 'The ca t-
egory de fined by th e subjective test, 110\\·ever , is significantly under-
inclusive. Stigm a arises n ut only from what schoo l board m embers 
intend, but from \\·ha t o thers perce ive th em to intend. Dignitary harm 
may be inflic ted b y interactions amo ng the school board , victilll, and 
community \\·hich have little to do wi th the desires of government 
officials. 12 2 
One example of the limitati ons of the subjective approach is found 
in Higgins ·u. B oard of Lr/uco t iun.':.! :: In that case, a pupil transfer 
plan avoided bu sing white children to bl ack sch ools clue to an e:--;_-
pressed fea r of " " ·hite flight, " but bused black children to "·hitc 
schools . The plan was held comtitutional since it was "motivated by 
1 ~0. Brunso n Y. Bo~nd of Trustc c.s . ·1:2!1 F. ~ll ~~U. ~~G C> til Cir. 1~70) (Sobc loff, .J.. 
co !J c uning) . Dig· 11it~l l'\ ' harm is th e 0 11 h· hanu alleged to res ul t fro m raci ~tl imlx il a nce 
11· h ich h as ll<lt bee n IJrought II!Hit:r L·mp iric:d fin:. T l1i s is primarilY because !he "ins ult" 
o r "stiglll:t" is n ot I'C :Hiih· s ubj ect to empirical in, ·csl ig:ltiou. St· c Fi s>, sufna n ote Ill , :1t 
~00-0!i . T h e related :tllcgat io11 ol p sl't:lwlog icil tl:lmage is more s ubj ec t to emp irica l 
1·a!id:1tion throu g·h th e st a udartl tools of ps ;ch o!og ica l tt ·st in g·. Thne i,; ,;o m e question ;1s 
to th e entpiric;tl c:-; iste nce o [ such h:1rn1. Sec '\. ST. j o11:-; , sufna no te 117, at !i~ - 80. 
1 ~ 1. :HI L·.s. :1 1. 1!1·1. 
~ ~~. The in su l t c:tn e asi h · :tri se 11·ithout co n scio us discrim in :t tion o n the pan of t he 
ddel ttl aut,;. See C ui ted Sl:ltes 1. Sc h oo l Di S!. of Om:1ha. :->'!! F.'!d :-> 30. :'i -10-·lt i (ilt h C ir. ). 
rc rt. tlcnicrl. 4:Zcl l ' S !1-Hi (l'II :-> J (" [ \! l:l!;,ing T ec h :t spec ia l ed ucat io n sc lwo l ·except in 
uam e,' . . d e leting· at trac ti,·e n>cttion :t! U H!rsc .s anti s ubs tituting co urses ai med :11. 
meeti11g bla ck stereo11Ves . . . penniuing· T ec h's e nrollment to dip far bel o w ca pac itY 
.. . combin ed to res ult in a hig·h sc h oo l 11·h ich ,,·a s identifi ed :1s ';1 " col o red school'' jus t 
;ts certainh :1s if the " ·"nls ''"''-' prinll'll ;1C!HSS it.s l'lllLilll'l' i11 si :-;-i n c h !t: u ns .· ' '): Blocke r 
\'.B oa rd of E<luc. , :!'!G F. Supp. 20o, '!~!I (E.D.'.' .Y. J!JG,J) (a ltho ug h sc h ool bo ard had n ot 
dra11·n rc tci :tl bouiHLtri c.s. cot lrt f1>11111l 1h:1t studt' IJ! s " .sl'l: th e m se ht·s Ji,·i11 g in an almost 
e ntireh · :\t·gro area and :lllt'!Hiing a school of ;; imil a r chara c tn. lf thev emc rg·c bcnntd 
the co1.1fin cs of the \' ;tllc;· area . !h ey en ter :t diffcrutt 11·orld inhabited o nl y by 11·hite 
pcup!t:. . . T h e \'alleY s itu ati on gc n e r:1t cs the ,;ame fcclit1 g; o f in (cr i<.>r it \' ;:s to thei r 
st atu s in the communit y :t s 11as fo un d hy th e Supre m e Court in ./i u m'/1 . .. . " ); ;\ . ll!CKI:I . , 
T!!£ SLI'I(E'. t E Co CRT ,\:-;IJ TilL IDL\ 0 1 ]'go<:I(ESS I I ~ (l:J70). 
1 ~;:1. :JOS F.2d 171 (lit h Cir. El/1 ) 
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a desire to achieve racial balance," 1c 1 despite its failure to achieve such 
balance. Such a policy, hC)\\C\ cr, runs the profound risk of stigmatizing 
blacks by conveying the message that ,,·hite schools are good and black. 
schools are bad. Since there "as no desire to segregate, ho"·ever, the 
policy could not be questioned under the subjective standard. 
The foreseeability test fur segregati\e intent is also an inappropriate 
measure of potential dignitary harm. 1 t !ails to distinguish ben,·eeil 
foreseeable racial imbalance that is stigmatizing and that "·hich is uot. 
The probability of stigmatization might be related to the degree of 
racial irnbalance, the community climate, the history of public schools 
in the community, or a host o[ other Llctors that the foreseeability test 
fails to take into account. 
In contrast, the proposed test lor institutional intent would dehne 
de jure segTegation in terms of objective circumstances that are likely 
to correlate with the potential for dignitary harm. Actions that can 
be justified under the test in terms of educational criteria will rarely 
stigmatize, for the message communicated to black students and the 
community will be that the government acts solely on the basis of 
educational cost and quality. Indeed, the issue highlighted by the 
model of institutional intent is whether the government is perceived 
to act "as if" it had a segregative purpose. 1 ~:; Furthermore, since 
schools are responsible for affective as well as cognitive development, 
stigma resulting from government actions is one of the educational 
criteria by which available options must be judged. Hence, as school 
boards' actions inflict greater dignitary harms, they become less edu-
cationally justifiable and thereby less likely to pass scrutiny under 
the institutional test.126 
2. Educational Harms 
Harm may also be inflicted where racial separation hinders the 
cognitive educationa l development of minority children. The subjec-
tive interpretation does not capture adequately this concern for ed-
ucational harm. Since the test focuses on subjective motivations rather 
than objective conditions in the schools, it is analytically blind to 
the circumstances that seem to be correlated with the educational 
hanns of racial imbalance. Si1nilady, the foreseeability test does not 
respond to the potential for educational harm. The literature sug-
gests that separation is more educationally harmful in some circum-
!~·!. ld. ~Jl 791 (adoptiug fimli11g of district c"urt). 
l~:'i. Sec pp. 331. '\'lo sujn11. 
l:2t). Scf' p. :~~~8 sujJI"II. 
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stances than others. 1 ~ 7 The foreseeability test, with its blanket require-
ment of desegregation, is not sellSitin' to circumstances. 
In contrast, the proposed test lor institutional intent forges an 
analytical link between educational harms and de jure segregation. 
"T he institutional test requires that segregative policies be justified 
by educational objectives. To the e:dent that a policy produces racial 
imbalance that is likely to result in educational harms, 1 ~" such harm 
must be taken into account in evalua t ing the net educational merits 
of the policy. 1 :!9 
B. The Balance of Color Blindness and ,)·uuslantive Equality 
The Keyes Court's use of the concept of segregative intent to dis-
tinguish de facto from de jure segregation can also be understood 
as a compromise between competing interpreta tions of equal protec-
tion: one tradition searches fur race-cunscious elements in the process 
bv \\·hich decisions are made: the other finds violations based on a 
I . 
particular policy's disproportionate impact on minorities. 1 :~o The im-
plicit resolution of this conflict in Keyes was a decision to retain the 
de facto/de jure distinction, but to allow broad presumptions that 
facilitate a finding of de jure segregation without explicit proof of 
race-conscious government actions. 
The process-oriented interpretation of equal protection was founded 
on the ideal that government should treat citizens 1\·ithout regard to 
r ace.Dt Some courts, taking this "color blindness" norm to be the 
basis of the Broce/1 decision, held that student assignment explicitly 
based on race \\·as the constitutional violation necessary f(n a finding 
o[ cle jure segregation. 13 ~ 
127. See :\. Sr. Jollx, mjna note 117, at 107-!Cl; Goodman, llljnu note 3, at ·127-30; 
Weinberg, .wjna note 117, at 25·1-::iS, 268-69. 
128. For anah·se,.; of the conditiom 11·hich :iL'Cill to correlate \\'itlt educational harm 
arising from segregation, sec the sources cited in note 117 supra. One ob1·ious example 
\\·otild be the consistent undcrfumling of black ,.;chools. Racial imbalance may also cause 
ktrm to the extent that it denies students the po.,.;itile benefits of an integrated educa-
tion. For ec-:amplc, integration has been found dft:ct!\l~ in raising black acltie\ emcnl 
leYds whnc tile balance acilicl·ccl consists of a greater tliatt SO';·; \\·llite enrollment and a 
mix of socioeconomic lc1-ck F.g .. Goodma1t, suj1111 note ~. at ·102, 128-2') (e1:duating find-
ings i11 J. C:oLU!.\X ct a/., EQL.\LITY oF EDLC.\Ttux.IL Ot'I'OiULXITY (19150)). 
129. If racial imbalance is likely to produce educational harms, the school lJL>anl 
should clwose the less segrcgati1·e altcrnati1-c, cclnis jJaJiims, in order to a\'uid a finding 
of de jure segregation UIH.lcr the proposed test. T hus. the duty to aYoid racial imb:danc:e 
is directlY rcbtul to the probability that raci:d imbalance res ults in educational harm. 
1:\0. c:·ontj}(lrt..: Brest, Furcu•urrl) sujn ·ll note S/. tl'illi F i~s . sujJut note :--:~. 
! el L Lming \. \"irginia. el8~ c.s. I, lU-ll (l'Hilj: .ICC Hll:st , Frne<L'UJ'ii, Slljil'll note 87; 
Fi.-;s, sujno nolc ~~. ;It 100~~~) (discussing tll~·sc crnnpctillg," p;!r;ldig-rns). 
1Cl~. L.g., Deal ,._ C:incinn:tti Btl. of Educ. , %'1 F .~d ;-,s, cJ9-6U (6th C:ir. 1%6). ccrt. 
denier/,:;::::~! L..'i. 817 (1967): Bell I'. School Dist., :::.:1 F.2d 20'1, ~Jej (7th C:ir. 196el). ccrl. 
r!cnicd, eli/ L.S. ~121 (1'.!6-t); Briggs , .. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 7/li, 177 (l~.D.S.C:. l95c>) (three-
judge court). Sec Goodman, sujna note 3, at 277-70, 2'!0-:llO. 
349 
The Yale Law J o urnal Vol. SG: 3 17, 197G 
Between Brown and Key es, ho,Yever, courts retreated h om the con-
cept that the Constitution simply required public school oHicials to 
ignore race in fulfilling their r esponsibilities Y;:; Jn sorne circumstances 
school official s " ·e re permittecP :J 1 or requirec.l 1:::; to integrate schools 
by explicitly taking race into account. This cle\Clopment lent credence 
to th e contention that it was not the use of racial classification that 
underla y th e vio lat ion in Brown, but the exi stence o f " inherently un-
equal" segregated schools. 1 3 n 
This focus on outcom es rather than race-consc ious criteria can be 
seen as part of a broader trend in th e law of racial equality . Concur-
rentl y with the pa rtial eclipse of color b lindn ess in the contex t of 
schoo l desegregation, courts had adopted th e view th a t equality had 
a substantive as well as a formal com ponent : these courts looked to 
the racially disproportionate impact oE challenged actions. 1 37 
133. See Keyes '· School Di st. :\o. I , 4 13 U.S. 189, 2:..'0 -32 ( I 'l l ~\) ( Po\\t: ll. J. , co ncurring 
in part and di ssenting in p a rt); Fiss, Un certain Potli , .111jna note :l, at 19-26 . 
134. Explicit rac ial ass ig nment by school a uthorities is pnmiss iblc if it is part of an 
attempt to eliminate racial imbala n ce. See, e.g. , Swan n ,._ Charlotte- i\Iccklenburg Bel. of 
Ed uc. , 402 U.S. I , 16 (1970) (d icta indi cating that polin prescribing that each sch oo l 
shall ha \'C ccrta in ratio of black to wh i tc s tudents "reflecting the proporti o n fo r th e 
di strict as a whol e" is within "broad discretionary powers of sch oo l au th oriti es"); Offer-
m a n v. :\itkowski , 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 196 7); School Co mm·r ,._ Board o f Ed uc. , 352 M ass. 
693 . 227 l\'. E .2d 729, aJ;peu l dis missed , 389 U.S. 572 (1967 ). "-\t tc m p ts to fo rbid su ch 
assignment arc th e mse h cs unconstitutional. Lee v. 1\'yquis t, 318 F. Supp. 710 (\V .D.N.Y. 
1970), aff'd II!C IIl. , 402 U.S . 93:) (1971); cf. North Carolina Bd. o f Ecluc. \. Swa nn , 402 
0.S. 43 (1971) (s triking dowtt antibusing law passed after finding of d e jme segregatio n); 
see generally Fi ss, U ncel'la i!l Path, sufna note 3, at 't -14 . 
135. In in teg rating formerly dua l school syste ms, all actions that ha\'C th e effect o f 
impeding integrati on a rc illegal. U nited States \'. Scotland :\cck Bd. of Ed uc., 407 U.S . 
484, 't 89 (1972); W rig h t ,._ Council of th e City of Empori ~t, 407 U.S . ·15 1, 460 (1072). To 
co mpl y 1\·ith this legal d u t\·, school boards ob\·iously must take r ace into account. Swa nn 
,._ Cha rl otte-\ l cckl en burg· Rd. of Educ., ·102 l.'.S. I ( 107 0) ( ttph olding dis tri c t co urt's ord er 
to bus students on the basi s of race) . 
13<i. Behind th e em ergence of th e n e11'Cr pos tl!On ma y lie tiiO defects in th e colorblind 
ideal. First. col o r blindness 1111 the pan of contemporary scl\()ol o fficial s is e ither unlik ely 
o r impossible. C i\t.: n cu rrent co ncern with racial balance in the school s and segregated 
li\ing pattcnt s, sch oo l ~td ministra tion s can not disa\'0\1' knowled ge of th e racial co mpos iti on 
of th e ir school s ys rcms. Se e Fi ss, Hacial I 111 val a nee, su fna note ;;, at 58'1-85 . Second , 
res iden tial distr ibution may \l·ell reflect social prejudices. See , e.g. , J. K.\JN & .J. Q UIG LEY, 
Housi:\G \L\RKETS .\.'>0 R.I CJ.\L DtsCRlMIN.-\TtO:\ 62 -87 (197'1) ; U:\I'!Til STAT ES co~L\tiSS I Oi\: 
o:-: Ctnr. RtGHTS, EQL\L Ot·I'ORTt;:\lTY I N Su JJ URBL\ (197·1); Tat:ulJcr, D e111ogra phic PersjJcc-
tives 011 Housing an d Sc h ool Scg rega ti o1 z, 2 1 W .\YN £ L. REI'. 83cl, 8·10-44 (1975) . Racial 
imbal a nce resu lting froni n e ighborhood school assig nme n t 111 ~1;· e mbody the racia l prej-
udice o f the co mmuni t;; thus, the sc h oo l board 's " colorblind' ' choice m ay n o t pre\·e n t 
ra cism from in Uuenc ing· a ttc nd a nee patterns. 
137. Prio r to K eyes, go,·enJm ent prog rams that prov idt:d a lm1·cr lc\·cl of services to 
minorities than to whi tes ha d bee n found un constitutional without any finding of 
exp licit r ac ia l cb ss ifi cat ion. F.g., Hawkins \·. Town of Shaw , 46 1 F .2d 1171 (5 th C ir. 
1972) (en !Jane) (lllunicipal scnices) ; 1\' a tonaball v. Hoard of Educ. , :J5:) F. Supp. 7 1G 
(D .i'\. :\fex . 1973) (schoo l reso urces); Hobso n 1'. Hansen , 269 F. Su pp. 40 1, ·106-97 (D.D.C. 
1067), aff'cl sub u u11t . Sm u ck \·. Hobson, '108 F.2d 17 5 (D.C. Ci r. 19G9) (en bane) (sch ool 
r esources). Other go\-crnmc nt prac tices that h ad dispropo rti o na te impacts o n minorities 
11·crc held to 1·iolatc the Fo urteenth Amen dment absent substant ial justifications. E.g., 
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The Court in Keyes "·as clearly cognizant of both the older ideal 
of color blindness and its partial erosion in favor of a substantive 
right to integrati on. Justice R ehnquist's dissent championed a r eten-
tion o f "Brown's prohibition aga inst di sc rimination," as against the 
adoption oE an "affirmat ive duty to integra te" ;13 8 .Justices Douglas 
and Powell each advocated, as the log ica l extension oE prior case law, 
th e abandonment o f the de facto j d e jure distinction and the adoption 
of a standard barring government actions with segregative effects. 13 !J 
The majority did not r e ject either branch o ( precedent. It adopted 
the con ce pt of segTega ti ve intent in o rder to r etain the de fac to j de 
jure distinction, an approJ.ch consistent " ·ith the colorblind ideal. Yet 
the Court a lso impli citly advanced th e concept o f a su bstantive right 
to integra ti on by adop tin g broad , often practically irrebuttable, pre-
sumpt ions o f segregative intent. 1 10 This aspect of the opinion appears 
to r eflect the doct rinal trend toward subjecting the r esults as " ·ell 
as the criteria of governmental decisions to con stitutional scrutiny. 1 ·11 
\\ ' hite , .. R eges ter. 41:! lJ .S. j;,:, (197 3) (a d optio n of multimember \(Jling di str icts); 
Al exander ,.. Louisiana, '1W• C .S . 6~:J ( l ~~ ~ ~) (.i urv selection procedures) ; Flridgepon 
Cu~rdiJns , Inc. , .. i\ !em bers of Flridge po rt C i,·il Sen ·ice Co mrn ' n, 48~ F.~d 1333 (2d Cir. 
1 ~ 17:1 ). rert. denied , 421 U .S. 0lJ l ( 1~17 0) (golemmcnt employm cm cx:tminations); cf. Griggs 
v. Duke P011·er Co., 401 F S. 42 !, •13 1 ( 107 1) (abscnt sh o\\ ing o f job-rela ted ness, cmplo y-
m cnt practice that opera tes to cxclude !;lacks 1io lates Titl e VII of th e Ci1·il Rights Act 
of 196-1). 
:\ftcr th e J:crn dcc is iun. tile lJ( 'IHI to\1- ~ln l c lose sn ulill\ ' of di,;proportic)l}ale outcomes 
continuL·d in co nstituticnul ClSt:s. Sec Ta1lor 1. Louisia11~1. 41 ~1 L S. :)2:! . :J38 ( !C)7:> ) (con-
s til!llional requ irc inc nt that jun· pool i>c "dra11·n from a sou rce fairh· rcprese n tat ii'C o f thc 
co mmullit,·") ; Boston C: hap tn . :'\.\.-\C:I' '· Bccchn. ,-,ot F.2d 1017 ( l st C ir. 1!1 /J ) , eel'/. 
cleniecl , 421 U.S. ~)[0 ( l ~l/ · 1 ) (employment tes ts); Bc rke lm a n , ._ Sa n FrJnc isco U nified 
School Di s t. , 50 1 F .~d 126-1, 1267 (lJth Cir. 197·1) (c ntr ~l ncc requirem ent for acad emic high 
school ); Bm11·n 1. Bo:ml of Educ .. ;l:)(j F. Sup p. 11 0, 1 ~!1 - 20, (:'\.D. IlL 107-1) (sc hool 
r esourccs). Th e focus 0 11 outcome rat h er tha n process s imil a rly expanded in d ec ision s 
u nd er thc C ivil Ri g hts :\cts. L.g., L11l 1. :\'ichols , -Ill LJ.S. 5G3 (19n) (nondiscrimin atory 
r ef usa l to pro1·ide prog ra m for no t1 F. ngl ish- sp caki11g s tude n ts 1·iolatcd sta tu tory guarantee 
of equ a l ed ucational oppmtunil ''J· Fur r ccc 11t discuss io ns of these s tatutory and co ns ti t u-
tional trends, sec Fiss, .iii JHa no te ::>8; Zimmer , li eyoncl De Fun is : Uisfnuj;ortiunale Impact 
.-l nalnis oncl Afondotecl ''P rcfcu: IIU'>'' in La w Sl.'!wol .·lcilllissiulls , :J·1 l\' .C:. L. REv. 317, 
329-67 (1976) . 
Last Term's dec ision in \\'a shi11gt<>11 1·. D :t~ is , ~JG S. Ct. ~040 (107 6), casts some doubt 
upo n the future of raci al imp ac t in co nstitu ti o nal a nal :-sis. It ex pl ic itl y rej ected solc 
r e li a nce upo n a n impa c t test in pul)lic e mploy m c11t cases. l d . at 2049. No neth e less, th e 
Co urt m:1de cl ea r that di scriminatory impac t rcm~lincd n:l•:~ ·ant , and some tim es dctermin a -
til·e, in th e search for th e req ui si tc " di scrilllinator;· pu rpose'' Jd. at 2046-'19. 
138. 'Jl fl U.S. at 2:)8 (R clmqni st. J., dissen ti ng). Ind eed , th e maj ority in te rprets Justice 
R chnquist as ad:-ocat in g a rct um w the intcrprela tio n o( B roa:n :uh·a nccd in Briggs v. 
Elliott , l ci2 F. Supp. 7/ti , 777 (E.D.S.C:. 1 ~1) -, ) (tl m .:c -judgc court) ("T h e Constitution ... 
d ocs no t require illlcgrati OII. It merl'ly forbids discri min J ri on. ") ·1 13 U.S . at 200 n.ll. 
The majority ex plic itl y r ejected thi s fo r n1u l:!t ion. !d. 
139. -±13 U.S. at ~ 15-lli , 217-36 (Do ugl:i', l'o\\cll, JJ ., conc ur r ing in pJrt a nd dissenting 
in part, r cspecti1-cly). 
140. Sec Fiss , Un catai n Pu t/1, sujJUI n ote 3, at ~ l-2G . 
1-11. Al tho ugh the Co u rt did no t explicitly disc uss th e trend , .Just ice Po\\-cll 's partial 
concurrence applauded the maj ority's "mo1 c . . . w·.,·anl breaking d own past sectional 
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1\ either of the interpreta tions of segregative in tent current in th e 
case law r es ponds to this compromise among competing precedents 
and values. The subjective test is sens itive to the concerns of the older 
"colorblind" precedents but fails to acknowl edge the newer "substan-
tive equality" trend. In contrJst, the foreseeability test, by collapsing 
th e de facto j d e jure distinction, casts itself loose from any analysis of 
th e proc ess by "·hich governmental decisions are made. 
The proposed test for in slitt ttion al inten t, ho,,· ever, responds to this 
compromise in th e Ke yes opinion . On on e ll<HHJ, it is com patible ,,·ith 
the tradition of color blindness. ~egrega tive impac t a lone is insuffi-
cient to make out a case of illegal segregation; an in st itution cannot 
be said to have engaged in de jure segregat ion unless it has acted "as 
if" segreg·ation ·were one o f its purposes. Furthermore, it r ecognizes 
the poss ibility that institutions as ,,·ell as individuals may be biasecl, 11 ~ 
giving "color blindness" a fuller interpreta ti on . O n the other hand, 
th e test ackno"·ledges the principle o f substantive equality by sub-
jecting foreseeably segregative act ions to a demand for substantial 
educational justification. 
C. The Problem of " State Action" 
· A final concern that may underlie the de factojde jure distinction 
is based on the notion that school boards should not he liable for 
racial imbalance brought about by individual choices and changes 
in demogTaphic trends. According to this r easoning, ,,·here school 
policies that do not explicitly ass ig·n children by race have r emained 
unchanged, and racial imbalance has evolved within that racially neu-
tral framework, there has not b een the "state action" necessary to 
make out a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 1 ·1:1 This reasonmg may 
disparities." 413 C.S. at 230. He comme nted th at th e law "has come a lo ng way si nce 
Jhown l ," id. at 230 n.l 5, and concluded that "as forcshado11·ul in Swan11 a nd as implicitly 
held toda y school boards ha Yc a dut1· to minimi ze and ameliorate seg rega ted conditions 
by pursui;1g an affirmati1·c poli cy ' of d esegrega tio n," id. at 236. Similarl y, Justice 
Rchnquist, in dissent , co mplained of the Co urt's "s ignificant extension of Brown's 
prohibition ag·a inst discrimination and the con1-crsion of that pro hibition into an affirm a-
tii'C duty to integrate, " concluding that h e co uld "sec no cons tituti o nal justification fo r 
it." lei. at 258. He accused th e Court of takin g a "long leap in this area of constitu tion a l 
hw." !d. at 265 . 
142. See note 87 suj;ra. 
1-l:l . See, e .g., Pasadena C it v Hd. of Ed uc. , .. .S pan g ler , 9G .S. Ct. 26~J7 , 270·! (197G) 
(dicta) ; S11·ann 1. C harlo tte-.\I ccklcnburg lid . of Ed uc. , 402 U.S. I, :ll <l2 (1970) (d ict a); cf . 
Jackson , .. Metropolitan Edison Co. , ·119 U.S . 3'1:). cF>7 (197-1 ) (mere state agen cy approYal 
docs not rend er actil·ity initiated by r cg·Itiatcd po11-cr company sta te action in a bsence of 
evidence that s tate agency ordered act il·ity); see generally B u rke & Rcber , Slate !l ction, 
Con gressional Pow n and Creditors' Hig hts: , 111 Essay on the Fourteenth ;lllleru!lllenl, 4G 
S. C\L . L. REV. 1003, 103-1, 1109 (1973). 
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be defended on the policy premise that since individual autonomy 
is a significant value, 111 the state that intervenes to alter situations 
arrived at through individual choices is more suspect than one that 
merely allows such situ at ions to come about in an unchanged legal 
framework. 11 ·' Only the first class of activities should be considered 
state action subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amcncl-
n1ent.14G 
Some courts have stated that t he issue of segrega tive intent is equiva-
lent to the issue of state action. 117 The concept of " intent," ho wever, 
appears disjunct from the issu e of "state action ." "Intent" looks to 
the purpose behind a part icular action; the question of "sta te action" 
is concerned with whether or not a governmen tal bod y may b e said 
to have caused, or be responsible for, a part icular action. 118 T his. in -
sight is confirmed by Washington v. Davis.140 There the Court held , 
citing Keyes, that "discriminatory purpose" differentiated constitu-
tional from unconstitutional actions in a con text in which there 
could have been no doubt as to the presence of state action. 1 ~ 0 There-
fore, the interpretation of segregative intent adopted n eed not be sen-
sitive to concerns of state action and individ ual autonomy. 
Moreover, it is far from clear that, in the context of a desegregation 
suit, there \\·ill ever be a lack of state action. T he operation of publ ic 
schools constitutes "state action " as that term typically has been ap-
plied in equal protection analysis. The state is identified with its 
public schools, 1\·hich it forces students to attend, and over which it 
1·1 1. This ;trgumcn t has Sllhst;tltti;d pililoso phicd lllld n pitlllings. t ." n dcr a u t ilit ar i;lll 
analysis. autonomy is often a precondition fo r eff icien cy. It is difficult for gove rnme n t to 
know and c umtd;ttc indi,·id ual prefere n ces . Sec :\. SL!', C:o u .r:cnv£ CHoiCE ,\1\D SoCI.\L 
\ Vn.F.\KL 8~). ] ~\ 1 (111/0; : Mishau. SurVI'Y of lrcifarc Ewno111ics, 1939·59. 70 Eeoc;. l Eli 
( l ~l(iO ; . Tl tcrdo re. on thi s ihco r\ tile goud of '"cicl,. CJJ J IJc m;JxinJiznl IJy ;d!Jmi ll g 
indi,·idu a l c iti zens, who kno,,· th e ir preferences better than a n y oth er pot ent ial d ec isio n -
m aker, to m ake as m any o f the choices affec ti ng th ei r lin?s as is fea s ible. Individ11al 
autonumv ma,· ;tho lJe considered a m o ral , ·;d u e in and of itself. See R. 1\"0ZJC:h., :\1' .\RCIIY. 
ST.UT, A;l) c ·;·o l'l.\ (1 11/4); R. \VoLFF, l.'\ DFFE'\SL OF .\1\.\i(CI!IS:\[ (1970) . 
H5. See J.lurke & R eber, supw note H:;, at 1016·17. 
14G. See P eterson Y. City of Creell\ill c, 37:1 U.S. ~ ·1 ·1 , 250 (1963) (Ha r la n , J., co lt · 
curring). 
1·17. Cnit cd States Y. Texas Educ. Agency, 5:;2 1'.2d 380. 3SG (:ith Cir. 107li), vuw ted 
allil ronat1rl ul /HT Clll·iwn su/1 . non1. Austin Indep. School Disl. Y. U nitcd States , '15 
L..'i.L.\V. :l-1 13 (l' S Dec. ii. l ~J/ii; : Bronson \ . 1\o;ml o f Etluc .. :-,:z,; F.~d 3+L MS (lith C:ir. 
197:>), en/. dellicrl. 'i(i .~. Ct. lli!i :-, (111/!i) ("" In a scho11l .s\s tem \\·hich ,,·as )liTI·ioush· scg· 
regaled iJ,· sl;ttc L11' there is " " requirelllc ll l th;tt intcnt IJe shn\\·n. The stale action 
requireme.nt of the Fourteenth .-\mct1dment is 11 o t a n iss ue.") 
H S. Indeed, th e 1-:eres Co urt defi n ed th e .. essc n lia l d cmcllts of de jure scg regatio11" as 
.. ;t current conditi<> n oi· sL·grcgatio n resulting from inlcnliun al stale actiuu." 413 C.S. 1 :3~1. 
:206·07 (l'l/3) (cmph;JSis ;tddcd). It th erefore implicitly dist in g uished thc issue of in te n t 
from th at o( sta te actio n. 
H9. 9G S. Ct. ~010 (I 'l/G) 
150. ld. at ~ll t(j .;:-,2 (e mployment discr int inatio n hy Di s trict o( Columbia go,-cm m elll ) . 
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exercises plenary controJY:i 1 Furthermore, it is unreasonable to con-
tend that the state involvement is not '' act ion'' in the constitutional 
sense. As noted above, 1 :; ~ the attempt to distinguish "passive" from 
"active" government involvement in th e school system is a questionable 
enterprise, since present pass ivity is a continuation of past action. 
Finally, holding som e forms of racial imbalance to be de facto segre-
gation is not likely to furth er the policy preferen ce fo r individual 
autonomy discussed above . The fr ee and autonomous choices valued 
by philosophy do n o t, in general, d etermine pupil attendance pat-
terns even when th e government has not alter ed its policiesY':; 
In sum, "state ac ti on " in the constitutional sense appar en tly a lways 
exis ts in the operation of sc hool systems, and the value of individual 
auton omy is not \\·ell-served in distinguishing ben\· een de facto ancl 
de jure segrega tion. It is th erefore unso und to view r eso lution of 
the state action issu e as one of th e fun ctio ns of the Keyes Court's 
retention of the de facto j de jure distinction. 
Conclusion 
This Term, in Austin Independent School D istric t v. United 
Stales, 151 the Supreme Court vacated a lower court's finding of seg-
regative intent and remanded the case "for r econsidera tion in light 
of ·washington v. Davis. " In ~Vashington the Court bad announced 
the "basic equ al protection principle that the invidious quality of a 
law claimed to be r ac ially discriminatory must ultimately b e traced 
to a racially discriminatory purpose." 1 55 A wtin makes it clear that the 
151. See heyes v. Sc hool Dist. P:o. 1, 41 3 U.S. 189, 21:) -16, 227-28 (1973) (Douglas, 
Powell , .JJ. . concurring in pan and disse n ti ng in part , rcspcct iYcly). 
F>~. l'p. 330-cll supra . 
1 5~. First, pri1atc choi ces a rc th e msch·cs shaped by go1crnment act io ns. "(S]t udent 
ass ig nment and schoo l constru cti o n may ha1 c a profo und r ec ip rocal effect on the racial 
compos i tion of residential neighborh oods within a metropolitan area . ... " Keyes \'. 
School Dist. No. I , 413 U.S. 189, 202-03 ( !973) . Second, it is e ith er parents or th e s ta te 
1d10 determin e a tte ndance pattern s. H ence, the Ya lu es attach ed to autonomous choices of 
students, see note 144 supra. do not come direc tly in to p lay. Cf. \Vi sco nsin v. Yoder, '106 
U.S. 205 , 2'11 -49 (1972) (Dougl:ls, J. , di sscm ing in part) (dist in g uishing pare nts' rig ht to 
co n tro l child's educa tion fro m s trongcr rig ht of ch ilcl rcn to rei igio u s fr eedom, a nd noli ng 
potential for confli ct be t\\·een th e two) . T hi rd , the choice o f 1d1erc to 1il'e is not till-
cons trai ned. D isc rim in a Lion m ay make hous i 11 g wu 1·aila bl c to minorit ies in particular 
no.:ighborhoods. See note 136 suJ;ro (citing sources); P:ote, }{ acial S teerin g : Titl e Vl!I rn1d 
the Real Estate Jhoher, 8:) YALE L.J. 808 , 809 -12 (!976). nu t see A ustin Indep . Schoo l Di st. 
1·. Un ited States, ·15 U.S. L\\'. 341 3 (U .S . Dec. 6, 1976) (I'O\\'cl l, J. , concurrin g) (Yoluntary 
preferences are prim:~ry d eterminants of r cs id e nti:~l p a Lterns). Furth ermo re, cho ice of 
housing locat io n m ay d epen d upon such factors as price o r proximity to work as wel l as 
educa tional op port uni ties . Thus, 11 here a JH:ighborhoocl schoo l p o li cy is adop ted, the 
res ultin g· attend ance p atterns may not be due to the autonomous choices of parents. 
154. •15 U.S .L.W. 3!13 (li.S. Dec. 6, 1976) (per curiam). 
155. 96 S. Ct. at 20-!8. 
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concept oE "purpose or intent'' in Keyes is one instance oE th e "pur-
pose" required by TVashinglon. Accordingly, the problems of inter-
l)retation and apnlica tion which this Note has identified fo r seorerrat i,,.e L V ~ 
intent are liKely to arise in all equa l protection anal ys is. 
The H'ashin gton Court confronted the same dilemmas of policy 
,,·hich , thi s :\'ote has argued , lay at the root of th e A"ne.1 decision: the 
conflicts ben,·een the ideal of substantive equality and the norm of 
color blinclness 1 -,,; To mediate this confl ict in fht shinglon, th e Court 
fell bacK on an undefined not ion of "cliscriminaturv nuroose. ·· _\s in 
' 1 1 
Knes. it failed to S])ec il\- \\·ho mu st maintain "di sc riminatorv pur-,., . / ) 
Pose ... \1hat that !lllrj)OSC consists of. or ho,,· it miol1t be on,vcci.J.-,7 . - 0 l 
As cases stand or fall on the presence or absence of "cl iscriminatory 
purpose," courts will be forced to parse the m eaning of tha t term 
just Zb they han struggled with "segregative intent. " This 1\ote has 
suggested a model that, whil e r emain ing consistent ,,·ith the struct ure 
o[ Keyes, permits the metaphor of "segregat ive intent" to focus dis-
cussion on the question that originally evoked it : \Vhen may th e 
government choose alternatives that result in racial imbalance? In 
light of Washington and Austin, a similar focus could illuminate equal 
protection analysis in general. 
l .">li . On th e o ne hand , the C:oun 11·as co nce mcd 11·ith th e p o tent ia l effect of th e 
notion that " [d]isproportio tLtt c impact is ... th e sole tou chs tone of an in1·idio us racial 
discrimination forbidden by th e Const itutio n ,'' ic/. at 20-i!J , and i r. foresail· ihat suc h a 
principk ,,·otlid im·alidatc "a 11·holc ra nge of ta:--:, 11·clfarc, p ublic sc nicc, regulatory and 
licensin g- sututcs." irl. at 20::!1. O n the ot her hand, the Court acknmdcdged that " dis· 
p roponion;llc impact is not irrclc,·ant,'' and that in so me cases "discriminatory impact 
. . ma ;· fo r all practical purposes demonstrate un c< m stit tttion ality." lrl. at 20·10. 
i:-1/. flf. :l l ~0 :-J - 1 (StC\.L' Il S, J .. CO ll Ctl rring) . 
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